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SECOND-GENERATION
MONOPOLIZATION:
PARALLEL EXCLUSION IN DERIVATIVES
MARKETS
Felix B. Chang*
The reluctance of antitrust to condemn parallel exclusion
permits oligopolies to be entrenched. This is because parallel
exclusion-multiple-firm conduct that inhibits market
entrants-cannot satisfy the current strictures on
monopolization, which are understood to prohibit single-firm
conduct. Yet this is an outdated way of conceptualizing
monopolization. An expansion of monopolization-to cover
parallel, non-collusive acts by an oligopoly-is due.
To push the law toward recognizing parallel exclusion,
this Article examines concentration in the markets for
financial derivatives, which are perennially dominated by the
same big banks. Even after losses under first-generation
antitrust claims, the dominant derivatives dealers have found
ways to retain market power. This Article therefore delves
into the market power dynamics that traditional theories
have sidestepped.
As a technical exercise, this Article illustrates the
relevance of market definition as a paradigm-particularly
for illuminating blind spots in financial regulation. As a
doctrinal endeavor, this Article buttresses the efforts of other
* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. I am
indebted to Tim Wu for his insightful comments. Thanks, too, to Tom
Arthur, Sarah Jane Hughes, Ryan Scott, Sandra Sperino, Rick Steuer, and
Sasha Volokh for their thoughts on earlier versions. This article benefitted
greatly from the Next Generation of Antitrust Scholars Conference at
NYU, the National Business Law Scholars Conference at the University of
Chicago, and presentations at Emory and Indiana University Maurer law
schools. I thank Vince Jabour for research assistance and Joel LeoGrande,
George Tepe, Erica Che, and the rest of the Columbia Business Law
Review team for their careful editing. All errors are mine.

COLUMBLI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW

658

scholars to frame
monopolization.
I.
II.

III.

IV.

V.

parallel exclusion

as

[Vol. 2016

a

form

of

Introduction................................659
Parallel Exclusion And The Derivatives Markets.....666
A. Parallel Exclusion.................
........ 667
B. The Derivatives Markets
.................. 672
Market Power Analysis ..............
..........
679
A. The Clearing Markets
..................... 682
1. Network Effects and Natural Monopoly
Characteristics
...................
..... 682
2. Defining the Market................
..... 685
i. Clearing of Interest Rate Swaps...............688
ii. Clearing of Credit Default Swaps.............690
3. Calculating Market Shares.....
......... 692
B. The Dealer Markets
............................695
1. Concentration and Oligopoly
Characteristics
...................
..... 695
2. Defining the Market............
........ 700
i. The Product Market ........
......... 700
ii. The Geographic Market .......
....... 704
3. Calculating Market Shares ......
........ 707
C. Stability of the Dealer Oligopoly ......
....... 710
Harms of Parallel Exclusion.......................718
A. Harm to Competition ...............
...... 719
B. Harm to Consumers
.............
......... 723
C. Harm to Systemic Risk ...........
......... 726
Offsetting Benefits
......................
..... 730

A.
B.

Enhanced Efficiencies
Credit Risk Mitigation

...............
..............

...... 730
...... 733

C. Weighing the Harms Against the Benefits.........735

VI.

Conclusion

.................................

738

No. 3:657]

SECOND-GENERATION MONOPOLIZATION

I.

659

INTRODUCTION

Imagine if the country's four largest airlines controlled
the primary airport serving Los Angeles ("LAX").' Such an
arrangement likely strikes us as unseemly, though the
2
degree of our discomfort might depend on several factors.
of this
potential harms
the
categorizes
Antitrust
3
while devising a schema for when to
arrangement,
intervene. For instance, collusion among the large airlines to
shut out their competitors would violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 4 while the purchase of LAX by the world's
largest airline may run afoul of Section 2.
However, if the four large airlines merely sat on a
committee that oversaw LAX's safety standards and
advocated for blocking rival airlines on safety grounds, an
antitrust violation would be much harder to establish-even
if, year after year, the same four airlines dominated
commercial flights serving the airport. Without explicit
agreement or single-firm conduct, current antitrust doctrine
provides little recourse.
Such is the quandary of parallel exclusion: "conduct,
engaged in by multiple firms, that blocks or slows would-be
of
evidence
robust
Despite
entrants."6
market

I On the collision of cultures borne of LAX's (in)famous congestion, see
generally Pico Jyer, Where Worlds Collide: In Los Angeles International
Airport, the Future Touches Down, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1995, at 50.
2 E.g., how much of the market do the four airlines control; how much
of the city's traffic runs through LAX; and how exactly do the airlines
"control" LAX?
3 E.g., leveraging, foreclosure, and exclusion. See Patrick Rey & Jean
Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 2145
(Mark Armstrong & Rob Porter eds., 2007); Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion
as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 527 n.1 (2012).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
5 Id. § 2. This is especially true if the purchasing airline commands
the vast majority of its relevant market.
6 C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J.
1182, 1185 (2013).
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anticompetitive, self-entrenching conduct by oligopolies,' the
law remains stagnant.' This Article attempts to move the
law by showing that parallel exclusion suppresses
competition in the financial derivatives markets, causing
harms consistent with monopolization.9
While the air traffic illustration above is hypothetical,
two gargantuan financial services markets are converging
similarly today. In the derivatives trading market,
derivatives instruments are bought and sold.o In the
derivatives clearing market, financial intermediaries known
as
clearinghouses
process
derivatives
trades."
Clearinghouses perform "back office" functions, such as
clearing, settling, and guaranteeing trades. 12 Since 2010,
financial reform laws have required most derivatives trades
to run through these intermediaries. 1 3 Characterized by
strong economies of scale, clearinghouses are natural

7 See id. at 1191-95, 1202-04 (analyzing parallel exclusion in the
credit card, piping, shipping, and tobacco industries, among others).
8 See infra Section II.A.
9 Derivatives are financial instruments whose values fluctuate on the
basis of other variables, such as interest rates, stock prices, and whether
an unaffiliated party might default on a loan. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215,
337-73 (2002).
10 See Bank for Int'l Settlements, Derivatives Statistics, BIS Q. REV.,
Sept. 2014, tbl.19, http://www.bis.org/statistics/dtl920a.pdf [http:/ /perma.
cc/877H-SL8C?type=pdfJ (quantifying the notional size of the OTC
derivatives market at $710 trillion as of December 2013).
11 See John McPartland, Clearing and Settlement Demystified, CHI.
FED LETTER, no. 201, Jan. 2005, at 1.
12 Id. See also infra Section III.A.1.
13 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675-82, 1762-84 (2010)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3); Parliament and Council
Regulation 648/2012, On OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and
Trade Repositories, art. 4, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 17-18 (EU).
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monopolies that financial regulations have rendered
indispensable to trading.1 4
Yet clearinghouses are also member-driven entities,
whose members are also the dominant players in the
adjacent trading (or dealer) market.1 5 Invariably, these
dominant dealers are the largest financial institutions in the
world." In the post-financial crisis derivatives landscape,
clearinghouses function as bottlenecks through which
adjacent markets' activities must pass.
Derivatives markets serve as a compelling example of
parallel exclusion and its harms for several reasons. First,
the same four or five players perpetually capture these
("OTC")
over-the-counter
for
especially
markets,
despite
oligopoly
the
preserve
derivatives." These players
market and regulatory changes. For instance, after financial
reform laws mandated centralized clearing for credit default
swaps, the top dealers conspired to funnel trades into the
clearinghouse that they controlled while denying rivals
access to the same clearinghouse." Even after settling a
class action for, among other claims, collusion and
monopolization," these dealers have not surrendered market
14 See Felix B.
Chang, Financial Market Bottlenecks and the
"Openness"Mandate, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 70-72 (2015).
15 Id. at 84-87.
16 See infra Section III.B.
17 Derivatives can be divided into exchange-traded and over-thecounter: the first category is traded on open markets, such as futures and
options exchanges; the second category is customized between the parties
to a trade. See Norman Menachem Feder, DeconstructingOver-the-Counter
Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 677, 731-36 (2002); Henry T.C. Hu,
Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1464-65 (1993)
(focusing on the OTC markets).
18 See In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476,
2014 WL 4379112, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014).
19 Katy Burne, Big Banks Agree to Settle Swaps Lawsuit, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 12, 2015, 2:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-wall-streetgroups-agree-to-settle-credit-swaps-antitrust-case-1441988741
[https://perma.cc/4LHH-Z5TQ]. Interestingly, the monopolization claim
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share.20 Therefore, the traditional antitrust frameworks of
collusion and monopolization have proven insufficient to
deter the oligopoly.
Second, parallel exclusion has spurred the clearing and
dealer markets to coalesce in a manner that replicates the
anticompetitive effects of monopolization. Critics of the link
between clearinghouses and dealers point to harms such as
foreclosure and leveraging, 2 1 whereby a monopolist's control
of a bottleneck facility enables the monopolist to exclude
rivals from the more lucrative downstream market.2 2
Traditionally, foreclosure and leveraging were seen as
monopolization offenses. 23 Yet, tradition also says that
monopolization can only be attributed to one dominant
firm.2 4 In their seminal article ParallelExclusion, Professors
Scott Hemphill and Tim Wu propose a "shared monopoly"
theory, whereby Section 2 of the Sherman Act is stretched to
encompass monopolization by multiple firms. 25 The
mechanisms of exclusion in the derivatives markets validate

could not move past the motion to dismiss. See In re Credit Default Swaps,
2014 WL 4379112, at *16.
20 See infra Section II.B.
21 E.g., Michael Greenberger, Diversifying Clearinghouse Ownership
in Order to Safeguard Free and Open Access to the Derivatives Clearing
Market, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 245 (2013); Wallace C. Turbeville,
Derivatives Clearinghouses in the Era of Financial Reform 13 (2010),
http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/12/derivatives-clearinghouses
al-reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL9S-P3PA].

in the era of financi

22 See CFTC & SEC, Public Roundtable on Governance and Conflicts
of Interest in the Clearing and Listing of Swaps 32-33, Washington, D.C.,
Aug. 20, 2010 [hereinafter CFTC Roundtable] (statement of Randy
Kroszner, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, Booth School of

Business).
23 See Baker, supra note 3, at 533 (noting that exclusionary claims are
most commonly framed as challenges to vertical agreements or
monopolization).
24 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1187.
25 See id. at 1236-40.
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within
exclusion
parallel
to
house
this
proposal
monopolization.
Third, certain types of parallel exclusion are harmful for
reasons beyond antitrust. Parallel exclusion in derivatives
markets shuts out rivals and injures consumers. 26 Yet, it also
perpetuates concentration among the major dealers, and
concentration is a surefire conduit of systemic risk.2 7
Combatting the dominance of incumbent dealers underpins
much of the corporate and financial regulation of
clearinghouses.2 8 In fact, breaking up dealer dominance has
been an implicit goal of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission's rules on derivatives clearing organizations.2 9
So far, though, regulatory efforts have failed in this
respect.3 0

All in all, parallel exclusion in derivatives markets is
likely to constitute a pernicious kind of exclusion-more
anticompetitive than efficient, and altogether risky for the

26 See infra Part IV.

27 See Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CAL. L. REV.
1641, 1677-78 (2013).
28 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TREAS-DO-2007-0018, REVIEW OF
THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE ASSOCIATED WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
COMMENTS
BEFORE
THE
DEP'T
OF
THE
TREASURY
(2008),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/comments-united-states-department-justice[https://perma.cc/PHV5review-regulatory-structure-associated-financial
7BL5] [hereinafter DOJ COMMENT]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTS ON
PROPOSED RULES LIMITING OWNERSHIP AND REGULATING GOVERNANCE FOR
DERIVATIVES CLEARING ORGANIZATIONS, DESIGNATED CONTRACT MARKETS,
AND SWAP EXECUTION FACILITIES, COMMENTS BEFORE THE U.S. COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMM'N (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/com
ments-proposed-rules-limiting-ownership-and-regulating-governancederivatives-clearing [https://perma.cc/2RFU-QJWW]; Derivatives Clearing

Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334,
69,355 (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter CFTC, DCO General Provisions].
29 See CFTC, DCO General Provisions, supra note 28, at 69,355; Roe,
supra note 27, at 1690.
30 See Chang, supra note 14, at 94-101.
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financial system." Here, the inability of monopolization to
check parallel exclusion is an immense blind spot within
antitrust, amounting to hundreds of trillions of dollars.3 2
This Article ultimately concludes that the clearing
markets perpetuate concentration in the dealer markets and,
hence, exclusion is at play. Yet, in some ways, the conclusion
is less important than the analysis. By analyzing market
power, this Article injects a modicum of precision into the
debate over competition in the derivatives markets." An
assessment of market power is the first step in a fight over
exclusion.3 4 Before proving that clearinghouses perpetuate
dealer dominance, detractors must work through several
steps, including whether the scheme's anticompetitive effects
outweigh the enhanced efficiencies. In measuring the market
power of the key players and then tethering the findings to a
cohesive framework, this Article accomplishes a back-tobasics analysis missing from the debate."

&

31 See infra Part IV; see also Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1213
("[O]nly some fraction of parallel conduct is exclusionary and some fraction
of that is both exclusionary and anticompetitive.").
32 See infra Section III.A.2, III.B.2 (discussing the size of the OTC
derivatives markets). See generally Baker, supra note 3, at 528 (discussing
antitrust's difficulty in dealing with exclusion).
33 On the relationship between stability of and competition between
clearinghouses, compare CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 67
(comments of Roger Liddell, CEO, LCH ClearNet Group), and supra note
22, at 71 (comments of Jonathan Short, ICE Trust), with supra note 22, at
47 (statement of Jason Kastner, Vice Chairman, Swaps and Derivatives
Markets Association.).
34 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 6.4 (5th ed. 2011); Hemphill & Wu, supra
note 6, at 1237-38.
35 Prior work has been done on the market shares of clearinghouses
for exchange-traded derivatives. See generally TINA P. HASENPUSCH,
CLEARING SERVICES FOR GLOBAL MARKETS: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLEARING INDUSTRY (2009). Clearing markets for
OTC derivatives have been harder to assess, due to the newness of the
markets. For one of the few analyses in this area, see generally Li Lin
Jay Surti, Capital Requirements for Over-the-CounterDerivatives Central
Counterparties(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 13/3, 2013). On
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Yet market power analysis of the derivatives markets is a
difficult endeavor. In antitrust, the proper measure of
market power has been fraught with controversy.1 6 The
prevailing paradigm-using market share as a proxy for
market power-is the target of fierce criticism. 3 7 By
undertaking a methodical, if traditional, study of market
definition and market share in the derivatives world, this
Article broadly blends antitrust and financial reform
scholarship. This Article validates the market definition/market share paradigm by showing its ability to
illuminate blind spots in financial regulation. 38
The remainder of this Article unfolds as follows: Part II
introduces parallel exclusion and the derivatives markets.
Part III delves into market power analysis to create a fuller
picture of the upstream clearing and downstream dealer
markets. 39 Part IV examines the harms of parallel exclusion

concentration in the dealer markets, see OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND
tbl.1
(2014),
QUARTER
2014
FIRST
ACTIVITIES,
DERIVATIVES

https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financialmarkets/derivatives/dql14.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U2A-MHL5] [hereinafter
OCC, 2014 Q1 REPORT] and David Mengle, Concentration of OTC
Derivatives among Major Dealers, ISDA RESEARCH NOTES, no. 4, 2010 at 1
(Nov. 1, 2010).
36 Debate rages, for instance, over whether market share is an
appropriate proxy for market power. See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define
Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 440 (2010) [hereinafter Kaplow, Why
(Ever) Define Markets?]; Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets?
An Answer to ProfessorKaplow, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 740 (2013).
37 See, e.g., Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, supra note 36, at
440; Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 31, 31 (2014).
38 See infra Section III.B.2.
39 In upstream (wholesale) markets, firms sell to other firms; in
downstream (retail) markets, firms sell products to end-users. See
generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DEFINING THE RELEVANT
MARKET IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 14 (2014). For this Article's purposes, the

clearing market
downstream.

is

upstream;

the

trading

(or

dealer)

market

is
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in the derivatives markets. Finally, Part V discusses the
benefits.
II. PARALLEL EXCLUSION AND THE
DERIVATIVES MARKETS
Scholars have long recognized the difficulty of antitrust in
coherently dealing with exclusion.40 Broadly construed,
exclusion "is designed by the perpetrator to discipline or
exclude rivals so that it can attain or maintain monopoly
power."4 1 Such practices include monopolization, attempts to
monopolize, predatory pricing, tying, and some forms of
vertical integration.4 2 In doctrine, exclusion typically
surfaces as a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.43 In
practice, exclusion often implicates two markets, whereby
the perpetrator manipulates one market to foster its
dominance over an adjacent market. 44 This Article explores
just such an arrangement: five derivatives dealers
controlling a derivatives clearinghouse to protect their
dominance over the trading market.
While there has been a sea change to bring exclusionary
concerns to the forefront of competition policy," the impulse
40 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 527. The difficulty can be
attributed in part to the decades-long dominance of the Chicago School,
which has been skeptical of the place of exclusion within antitrust. See id.
at 528.
41 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 17.2c, at 715.
42 Id.
43 See Baker, supra note 3, at 533-34 (discussing the nuances of this
association).
44 See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
45 Leaders in this effort include the Post-Chicago School and the
Nobel Prize-winning economist Jean Tirole. For excellent summaries, see
generally Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical
Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW THE CHICAGO

SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
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to cabin exclusion within Section 2 of the Sherman Act
lingers on.4 6 This tendency confines the prosecution of
Recently,
exclusion to acts by a single perpetrator.
Hemphill and Wu's work has illuminated the gray area
where multiple actors are engaging in parallel exclusive
behavior without express agreement. For the most part,
courts have declined to recognize parallel exclusion. 8
Nonetheless, antitrust would benefit from a sustained study
of one industry over time, where an oligopoly has engaged in
recidivist exclusion, moving from one scheme to another to
maintain market power.
To that end, this Section serves as a primer on two fronts.
First, this Section discusses Hemphill and Wu's work on
parallel exclusion, noting in particular the judicial reception
of this theory. Next, this Section introduces the derivatives
markets and provides analysis that corroborates parallel
exclusion and its harms.
A. Parallel Exclusion
Parallel exclusion is "self-entrenching conduct, engaged in
by multiple firms, that harms competition by limiting the
competitive prospects of an existing or potential rival to the
excluding firms."4 9 Notably, the phenomenon occurs in the
absence of explicit agreement, 0 which makes it hard to fit
parallel exclusion within antitrust's current framework.
Without express agreement, anticompetitive behavior by

ANTITRUST 141 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008); Thomas G.
&
Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Krattenmaker
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Rey
Tirole, supra note 3.
46 See Baker, supra note 3, at 533-34 (discussing the nuances of this
association).
47 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1188, 1236.
48 See infra Section II.A.
49 Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1189.
50 Id. at 1190.

U.S.

&
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collusion;51

simultaneously, the behavior cannot satisfy monopolization,
which is an offense committed by one actor.52
While not all parallel conduct is anticompetitive or
exclusive, some pernicious types of parallel exclusion do
satisfy both thresholds.5 3 For instance, it is common practice
for firms to mimic a successful product or follow a fashion
trend; this would not exclude other market players or hurt
competition.
On the other hand, four major airlines sitting
on a committee that oversees safety standards for LAX and
independently advocating for rigorous safety standards may
indeed exclude the operators of shoddily maintained aircraft.
Even within the realm of parallel exclusion, not all
practices are on balance harmful. In the example above, high
standards might lock out some competitors of the four
airlines from LAX, but reducing the number of airlines can
simplify the airport's operations. Additionally, safety
concerns may more than offset the anticompetitive effects.
Hence, to separate detrimental and benign parallel
exclusion, Hemphill and Wu propose an approach that
requires (i) sufficient monopoly power, (ii) anticompetitive
effects, and (iii) lack of efficiency justifications.5 5
This weighing of anticompetitive effects and enhanced
efficiencies
echoes antitrust's treatment of exclusion
generally.
For
example,
traditionally
antitrust has
condemned the exclusionary effects of vertical integration
only where (i) the firm or firms involved have substantial
51
52

See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007).
See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509

U.S. 209, 229 (1993).
53 More precisely, parallel exclusion must, at a minimum, be
anticompetitive to be condemned. See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at

1186 ("[W]e do not insist that all parallel exclusion is anticompetitive, nor
do we think that most parallel conduct is exclusionary.").
54 Id. at 1214-15.

55 Id. at 1237-38. Note that this is one of two broad approachesshared monopoly (falling under Section 2) and aggregation of contracts

(falling under Section 1). See id. at 1235-50.
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market power, (ii) integration results in significant
foreclosure of a vertically related market, and (iii) the case
for enhanced efficiencies is very weak. 6 In fact, exclusion,
vertical integration, and monopolization are often conflated
and subsumed within a larger Section 2 analysis." Hemphill
and Wu's decision to house parallel exclusion within Section
2 must therefore contend with all its doctrinal baggage. Most
prominently, Section 2 is usually understood to prohibit only
single-firm behavior. Hemphill and Wu surmount this
obstacle by exploring, among other paths, the "shared
monopoly" theory of monopolization, which would harmonize
treatment of parallel exclusionary practices by both single
and multiple firms.
The "shared monopoly" theory, too, must overcome its set
of obstacles, chief among them the Supreme Court's
reluctance to extend Section 2 to multiple defendants acting
independently. For example, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly the Court required more than a showing of parallel
conduct or independence to move a Section 1 claim past
pleading." In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., the Court cast doubt on whether oligopolistic
price coordination or conscious parallelism would injure
consumers to the same extent as monopolistic predatory
pricing, noting that the general occurrence of price
coordination seemed unlikely.6 0 Both cases might be read
narrowly-and Hemphill and Wu certainly do so, by casting
both as cases about parallel pricing or collusion rather than

56 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34,

§ 9.3a,

at 422; see also id.

§

6.4a, at 298.

See Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 649, 655-56 (2014).
58 Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1236-37.
59 550 U.S. 544, 553-56 (2007).
60 509 U.S. 209, 227-29 (1993). Oligopolistic price coordination or
conscious parallelism are practices "by which firms in a concentrated
market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a
profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level." Id. at 227.
57
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parallel exclusion. 61 Nonetheless, even in recent cases where
parallel conduct was the basis for a Sherman Act claim, the
concept of parallel exclusion has enjoyed mixed reception at
best.
One recent case is In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust
Litigation, a consolidated class action against the major
players in the trading of credit default swaps ("CDS"), where
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had illegally
cornered the CDS trading market.6 2 The causes of action
included conspiring to fix the bid/ask spreads of dealers in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act6 3 and conspiring to
block the emergence of alternate trading and clearing
platforms in violation of Section 2.64 Conscious of the
vulnerability of a shared monopoly theory, the plaintiffs
staked their Section 2 claim on conspiracy to monopolize."

61 Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1199, 1240-41, 1241 n.246.
62 See Second Amended

Complaint, In re Credit Default

Swaps

Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2014), 2014 WL
1408256 [hereinafter CDS Antitrust Litig. Complaint].
63 The Southern District of New York explained this "spread" as
follows:
Market makers-also referred to as "dealers"-sell to
buyers, buy from sellers, and hold inventory until a match

emerges. In other words, dealers (the "sell-side" of the
market) sell CDS investors (the "buy-side" of the market)
liquidity: the ability to trade without having to wait for a
counterparty. A dealer offers a "bid" price at which the

dealer will purchase and an "ask" price at which the dealer
will sell. By keeping their bid lower than their ask, dealers
can capture the difference, known as the "bid/ask spread."

In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 2014 WL
4379112, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014).
64 CDS Antitrust Litig. Complaint, supra note 62 at para. 269, 273-

76.
65 See Plaintiffs Consolidated Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 45-46, 91 n.85, In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No.
13-MD-2476, 2014 WL 4379112 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014), 2014 WL
2862222, at 25-26, 55 n. 85 [hereinafter CDS Antitrust Litig. Pl.'s Consol.
Opp.].
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Conspiracy to monopolize is narrower
monopoly6 6 but rests on surer footing. 6 7

than
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shared

On a motion to dismiss, the Southern District of
New York permitted the Section 1 claim to proceed
but dismissed the Section 2 claim.68 The court noted
that precedent thwarted the shared monopoly
theory. 69 Further, the court would allow the
conspiracy to monopolize claim only if the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants conspired to form a single
70
entity to harness monopoly power.
On the heels of In re CDS Antitrust Litigation, the Fourth
Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of a group
boycott claim against several table saw manufacturers. In

SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., the plaintiff
invented and sought to commercialize technology to mitigate
table saw injuries. The defendants allegedly colluded to
develop safety standards that imposed unnecessary costs on
the plaintiff and prevented adoption of its device.7 ' The court
found that the plaintiff had adequately pled parallel conduct
and cited to ParallelExclusion as support for the "classically
anticompetitive" effect of defendants' conduct.72 However, the
plaintiffs only pled a Section 1 claim. 7 3 SD3 therefore adds
no new law on monopolization.

66

Shared

monopoly

encompasses

both

independent

and

interdependent exclusion, while conspiracy to monopolize covers only the
latter. See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1236.

67 In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *13-14.
68 Id. at *18.
69 Id. at *13-14.
70 Id. at *11-12.

71 SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 418-21 (4th
Cir. 2015).
72 Id. at 427.
73 Arguably, SD3 is a boycott case that falls into the "easier" camp
within parallel exclusion, where explicit agreement can be traced and the

oligopoly's stability is easy to achieve. See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6,
at 1189-90.
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No recent case has moved toward recognizing parallel
exclusion as a form of monopolization.7 4 This stagnancy in
the law bodes poorly after In re CDS Antitrust Litigation, a
case this Article will return to several more times, because of
the prominence the Southern District of New York plays in
finance-related litigation. As the remainder of the Article
argues, an outdated conception of Section 2 permits
dominant players in the derivatives markets to exclude
rivals while steering clear of Section 1's prescriptions, with
profound consequences for competition, consumer welfare,
and the health of the financial system.
B. The Derivatives Markets
Nowhere is concentration in the derivatives industry
more apparent than the CDS trading market, whose
evolution exhibits a pattern of recidivist exclusion by the
dominant dealers. Due to the high degree of customization
and low degree of liquidity that characterize trading, a few
dealers-large commercial and investment banks-emerged
early on as the dominant market-makers." At first, these
dealers were the only institutions capable of managing the
74 The plaintiffs in a Third Circuit case have noted the following in
their attempt to combine the defendants' market shares under Section 2:

The economic reality is that the harm caused by
Defendants' collective bundling practices does not hinge on
the presence or absence of agreement: the anticompetitive
outcome is the same with or without a conspiracy. While
some courts have declined to adopt this view, the Third
Circuit has never addressed it.
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at
25 n.28, Schuylkill Health Sys. v. Cardinal Health, Inc., No. 12-CV-7065,
2014 WL 3746817 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2014), 2014 WL 3817671 at 18-19 n.
28, ECF No. 57 (citing C. Scott Hemphill, ParallelExclusion: Is It Time for
a Theory of Shared Monopoly?, American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law Panel Discussion (Sept. 18, 2013); Hemphill & Wu, supra
note 6).
75 See In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476,
2014 WL 4379112, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014).
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peculiar risks of the market, and they profited handsomely
for it. Trading revenues for credit derivatives have hovered
around 10% of trading revenues for all derivatives ($530
million per quarter, out of $5.517 billion), even though credit
derivatives comprise only 4.3% of all derivatives."
With time, however, innovations sprang up to reduce the
market's imperfections, thus eroding dealer margins.
Trading volumes increased, and the instruments became
more standardized, which in turn exerted pressure upon the
market to become more transparent.7 All along, opacity has
permitted the large dealers to mark up their bid/ask spreads,
so these changes threatened their supracompetitive
pricing.
According to the plaintiffs in In Re CDS Antitrust
Litigation, the large dealers responded by capturing the
intermediaries and standard-setting bodies that were
ushering in these changes. First, the dealers limited the
dissemination of CDS pricing information.7 ' They were able
to do so because their representatives sat on the board of the
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation ("DTCC"), a
In the first quarter of 2016, trading in credit derivatives generated
$334 million in revenue for banks. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
76

CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES
ACTIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2016, at 4 (2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/top

ics/capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/dql16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A9NP-RYEX] [hereinafter OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT].
Revenue from CDS trading has historically swung wildly, from maximum
quarterly earnings of $2.727 billion (out of $10.217 billion for trading in all
derivatives) to maximum quarterly losses of $10.237 billion (out of $10.580
billion for all derivatives). See id. at 28, graph 9.
77 Standardization came about because ISDA introduced a Master
Agreement to document derivatives trades and also because of the
emergence of CDS indices, which aggregate data for a group of referenced
entities. See, e.g., In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *2;
Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 611-12
(2015).
78 See Turbeville, supra note 21, at 4; In re Credit Default Swaps,
2014 WL 4379112, at *1-3.
79 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *2-3.
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financial services company that compiles real-time posttrade data.s DTCC managed to secure from Markit, a
company that circulates DTCC's data, an agreement to delay
dissemination of CDS pricing information to Markit's
subscribers. Markit was a named defendant in In re CDS
Antitrust Litigation, and the large dealers held ownership
interests in it as well."1 This agreement was contrary to
Markit's own self-interest since its pool of subscribers was
broader than the defendant-dealers. However, sacrificing
short-term economic self-interest can help to elevate
independent parallel behavior to conspiracy.8 2
Later, when an electronic platform emerged to trade CDS,
the dealers undermined the venture by collectively directing
all their trades to ICE Clear Credit, a clearinghouse in which
the dealers held ownership interests and whose risk
committee the dealers controlled. 83 It was a creative scheme
of exclusion, leverage, and foreclosure: Dodd-Frank required
CDS trades to be centrally cleared; 84 a joint venture that
operated its own clearinghouse built an alternative trading
platform;s the dealers commanded the lion's share of CDS
80 Id. at *2. See also Global Trade Repository (GTR), DTCC,
http://dtcc.com/derivatives-services/global-trade-repository
[https://perma.cc/9RZD-QXZU].
81 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *11;
Memorandum in Support of Markit's Motion to Dismiss at 10, In re Credit
Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 2014 WL 4379112
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014), 2014 WL 1315324, at 8; CDS Antitrust Litig. Pl.'s

Consol. Opp., supra note 65, at 36-37.
82 See American Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S.
183,
197 (2010); In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *5.
83 In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *4-5.
84 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203 §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675-82, 1762-84 (2010)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3).
85 In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *3. On the
dominance of one of the joint venture partners, CME Group Inc., in the
futures market, see Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. Werner, The History of
Regulation of Clearing in the Securities and Futures Markets, and Its
Impact on Competition, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 313, 373-75 (2010).
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trading and routed traffic toward their clearinghouse;
without this traffic, the upstart clearinghouse could never
attain high volumes, and the closely linked exchange could
never get off the ground." To bolster this effort, the dealers
allegedly convinced Markit and the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association ("ISDA"), a trade group that created
documentation for derivatives trading, to forego granting
licenses to the upstart trading platform." Not surprisingly,
the venture folded soon after it started.8 8
For all its intricacies, In re CDS Antitrust Litigation was
a straightforward case. The defendant-dealers had allegedly
held secret meetings to coordinate amongst each other and
with DTCC, ISDA, and Markit in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.8 9 Horizontal conspiracies such as these have
always enjoyed primacy in the antitrust hierarchy. 90 Given
the choice, plaintiffs always plead collusion over exclusion. 9 1
Hence, the case would settle-for $1.87 billion-one year
after the Southern District of New York allowed the Section
1 and ancillary claims (but not the Section 2 claim) to go
forward. 9 2
86

On how this strategy has been deployed elsewhere, see DOJ

COMMENT, supra note 28, at 1-2.
87 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *4-5. The
dealers also sat on the boards of Markit and ISDA. Id.
88 See Louise Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Trading in
Derivatives, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/1
2/business/12advantage.html [https://perma.cc/N4NJ-PZBL].
89 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *4-5.
90 See Thomas C. Arthur, The Core of Antitrust and the Slow Death of
Dr. Miles, 62 S.M.U. L. REV. 437, 437 (2009); Baker, supra note 3, at 52728.
91 In fact, the class action complaint in In re CDS Antitrust Litigation
was peppered with references to collusion. See generally CDS Antitrust
Litig. Complaint, supra note 62.
92 See Jesse Drucker & Bob Van Voris, Wall Street Banks to Settle
CDS Lawsuit for $1.87 Billion, BLOOMBERG Bus. (Sept. 11, 2015, 10:16
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-11/wall-streetbanks-reach-settlement-on-cds-lawsuit-lawyer-says
[https://perma.cc/4CXA-5C52].
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Yet this Article is interested in the much harder scenario
of what happens afterward. So far, the CDS dealer market
has not loosened up. Large dealers continue to sit on the risk
committee of ICE Clear Credit, whose membership roster
has not expanded.9 3 We are also not likely to see the type of
explosive evidence of conspiracy that came to light, without
which this case would have failed.9 4 The stasis in the market,
despite the settlement, is all the more intriguing because it
hews closely to the reality that parallel action is frequently
the only thing that plaintiffs can point toward. Evidence of
horizontal conspiracy, the easier Section 1 claim, is simply
too difficult to gather. Moreover, if the dominant dealers
divest ownership in the clearinghouses or own only a minor
interest,9 5 the more established Section 2 claim of vertical

See infra Section III.B.
See In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476,
2014 WL 4379112, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) ("Plaintiffs could not
have discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence that they
were injured until December 2010, when the existence of secret meetings
was first uncovered by the New York Times.") (citing Story, supra note 88).
This is especially true in the aftermath of Twombly. For the defendants'
Twombly challenges to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' pleadings, see
Dealer-Defendant's Memorandum in Support of their Joint Motion to
Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint at 22-23, In re Credit
Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-02476, 2014 WL 4379112
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014), 2014 WL 996473, at 17 [hereinafter CDS
Antitrust Litig. Dealer Joint Mot.].
95 In 2008, ICE dove into CDS clearing by purchasing The Clearing
Corporation, a well-established clearinghouse, with the support of the
major dealers. See Press Release, IntercontinentalExchange & The
Clearing
Corporation,
IntercontinentalExchange,
The
Clearing
Corporation, and Nine Major Dealers Announce New Developments in
Global CDS Clearing Solution (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/Archives
/edgar/data/1174746/000095014408007998/gl6353exv99wl.htm [https://pe
rma.cclVK73-AYCF]. As for Markit, the extent and effect of the dealers'
ownership in the company was a contested issue in the case. See
Memorandum in Support of Markit's Motion to Dismiss the Second
Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 7, In re Credit Default
Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 2014 WL 4379112, (S.D.N.Y. May
93
94
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integration is not available. In In re CDS Antitrust
Litigation, the defendants repeatedly pounced on the
dubious status of shared monopoly and parallel conduct in
antitrust."6 The Southern District of New York ascribed to
this view. In dismissing the Section 2 claim, the court
appeared to endorse conspiracy to monopolize only under
very narrow circumstances-where the plaintiffs allege that
the defendants conspired to either form a single entity to
possess monopoly power or seek to allocate a market.9 7
Under these first-generation proscriptions of monopolization,
antitrust law cannot catch up to economic realities. Thus, to
nudge antitrust toward a more expansive, second-generation
vision of monopolization, the rest of this Article shall labor
through the mechanics of parallel exclusion in the OTC
derivatives markets.
Before moving on, however, this Subsection shall linger
on two additional points. First, In re CDS Antitrust
Litigation should be read as one in a line of cases
demonstrating the resilience of the dominant dealers at
retaining market power. This line includes a 2011
investigation by the European Commission into tactics by
the dominant dealers to maintain their stronghold over the
CDS market, 98 as well as private actions by pension funds

23, 2014), 2014 WL 2142262, at 6 [hereinafter CDS Antitrust Litig. Markit
Mem.].
96 See CDS Antitrust Litig. Dealer Joint Mot., supra note 94.
97 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *13-14 (citing
Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 532 F. Supp. 2d 556, 580 (S.D.N.Y.
2007)).
98 See Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission
2011),
29,
(Apr.
Market
Swaps
Default
Credit
Probes
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-11-509_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/E42G-THD2]. Interestingly, the European Commission
was investigating whether the dealers' use of Markit and ICE Clear
Europe, the dominant CDS clearinghouse in Europe, constituted "collusion
[analogous to Sherman Act Section 1] between them or an abuse of a
possible collective dominance [analogous to shared monopoly under
Sherman Act Section 2]." Id.
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and investment banks against the large dealers, ISDA, and
Markit for illegally cornering the market.9 9 However it is
framed,1 00 this impulse to exclude has characterized the
dominant dealers' behavior for decades, regardless of
whether competitors, consumers, and enforcement agencies
have prevailed.1 0 1
Second, the CDS market might be the poster child of
recidivist parallel exclusion, but not all markets behave the
same way.102 Some markets enable dominant firms to realize
their dreams of perpetual dominance because certain
imperfections
(including
perverse
consequences
of
regulation) create the opportunities to do so. Other markets
are perfectly capable of disciplining these impulses through
well-functioning competition. Thus, while this Article looks
to the OTC derivatives markets to substantiate parallel
exclusion, it is careful to distinguish among the markets for

99 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, MF Glob. Capital LLC v. Bank of
Am. Corp., No. 13-CV-05417, 2013 WL 7210066 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2013).
100 That is, whether it is the proclivity of intermediaries to suppress
efficiencies, see Judge, supra note 77, or simply inevitable business
practices.
101 In early 2015, the European Commission closed its proceedings
against thirteen banks in the CDS investigation. See Press Release,
European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Closes Proceedings Against 13
Investment Banks in Credit Default Swaps Case (Apr. 12,
2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEX-15-6254_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/56LQ-AFN4]. In July 2016, the European Commission
closed its investigation into Markit and ISDA after receiving legally
binding commitments from Markit and ISDA that they would license data
relating to CDS "on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND)
terms." See Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission
Accepts Commitments by ISDA and Markit on Credit Default Swaps (July
20, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-16-2586_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/WMQ2-ATUL].
102 Thus, it cannot be said that "a market is a market is a market"
any more than "a swap is a swap is a swap." See Gertrude Stein, Sacred
Emily,. in GEOGRAPHY & PLAYS 178, 187 (Univ. of Wisc. Press 2012) (1922)
("Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.").
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different derivatives and to highlight where the challenges
are most pronounced.
III. MARKET POWER ANALYSIS
If the four major airlines were to control LAX, we would
have to pursue three lines of inquiry before condemning the
arrangement. 10 3 First, what is the nature of this "control"?
Second, what are its harmful effects? Finally, what are its
benefits? The first question determines whether there might
be parallel exclusion, which this Section attempts to do for
the derivatives markets. The remaining two questions, which
will be taken up in Sections IV and V, separate harmful from
benign forms of parallel exclusion.
No examination of exclusion is complete without market
power analysis of the constituent markets.o' For OTC
derivatives, economies of scale and network effects work in
tandem to turn providers of clearing services into natural
monopolies with significant market power. However, the
downstream dealer markets are where the real profits lie;
these markets are also concentrated, with virtually the same
big banks controlling market activity year after year. If the
clearing and dealer markets are working together, then
there is a danger that the bottlenecks operating at thin
margins (clearinghouses) are being deployed to maintain the
dominance of the dealers in the adjacent dealer markets.

103 This Article adopts Hemphill and Wu's three-part approach. See
Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1237-38 (citing United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam)). This approach is
common to other types of anticompetitive exclusion. See also HOVENKAMP,
supra note 34, § 9.3a, at 422 (vertical integration).
104 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 4.2 (1984), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/lega
cy/2006/05/18/2614.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU4X-3B4S] (stating, as the first
prong of assessing anticompetitive vertical mergers, a finding that the
degree of vertical integration is so extensive that entrants to one market
would also have to enter the second market simultaneously).
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This Section dissects the intricacies of market power in
both upstream and downstream markets to assess the
validity of the charge that the clearing markets are the
instruments of dealer exclusion.10 Section II.A examines the
market power of derivatives clearinghouses, focusing in
particular on clearinghouses for interest rate swaps ("IRS")
and credit default swaps ("CDS"), two products that, prior to
financial reform legislation, had largely been cleared on
bilateral bases."oe Section II.B examines the market power of
derivatives dealers, wading into a longstanding debate over
whether this market is concentrated or not. Section II.C
examines the mechanisms by which the dominant dealers
control the clearinghouses.
In many ways, market power has never been more
important. The recent work of economists and legal scholars
has produced keen insights into how firms with market
power behave.1 07 Simultaneously, however, the traditional
measurement of market power-that is, the market
definition/market
share
paradigm-has
come under
intensifying assault."0 s Therefore, any discourse on market

&

105 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 14; Greenberger, supra note 21;
Turbeville, supra note 21.
106 Before the financial crisis, clearing was performed bilaterally, by
the counterparties to a trade. In 2009, the Group of Twenty nations made
centralized clearing a centerpiece of financial reform. With that push, both
the United States and European Union now require clearinghouses to be
interposed into derivatives trades. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 §§ 723, 763, 124 Stat. 1376,
1675-82, 1762-84 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3);
Parliament and Council Regulation 648/2012, On OTC Derivatives,
Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, art. 4, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1,
17-18 (EU).
107 See, e.g., ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCIs., JEAN TIROLE: MARKET
POWER AND REGULATION 2, 18, 28 (2014); see also supra note 45.
108 See, e.g., Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets, supra note 36;
Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57 ANTITRUST BULL.
887, 891, 894-95 (2012); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REV. 937, 947 (1981); Joseph Farrell

No. 3:657]

SECOND-GENERATION MONOPOLIZATION

.681

power must also thoughtfully defend its methodology for
assessment. At the risk of hitching itself to a methodology
that is slowly growing obsolete, this Article will utilize the
market definition/market share paradigm, both because of
its lasting influence on the courts 09 and because of its
capacity to uncover subtle trends in the derivatives
markets.1 o
share
definition/market
market
the
Specifically,
First,
observations.
following
the
paradigm produces
geographic
distinct
derivatives trading is comprised of
markets, the largest being the United States and Europe,
each dominated by a small oligopoly of approximately five
dealers.1 11 These large dealers compete fiercely against each
other within the oligopoly. However, as a block, they adopt
actions that exclude smaller competitors from breaking into
the oligopoly. Second, derivatives clearing does not
necessarily reflect the same geographic fragmentation, since
one producer dominates the clearing of IRS while two
112
Third,
producers appear to dominate the clearing of CDS.
in the U.S. trading market, activity should be tracked at the
bank holding company level, rather than the commercial
bank level. 11 3 Doing so broadens the tunnel vision of banking
regulators, who tend to focus on lending and ancillary
activities.' 1 4 Fourth, understanding the delineation between
commercial bank dealers and investment bank dealers helps
to parse the sales strategies of the major dealers-in

& Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic
Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL EcoN. 1, 1 (2010).
109 See, e.g., Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d
1188, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 2009).
110 See infra Section III.A.2, III.B.2.
111 See infra notes 214-215 and accompanying text and Section
III.B.3.
112 See infra notes 158-159 and 163-164 and accompanying text.
113 See infra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.
114 See infra notes 205 and 211-213 and accompanying text.
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particular, whether major dealers tie IRS and CDS to the
provision of credit."
A. The Clearing Markets
1. Network
Effects
Characteristics

and

Natural

Monopoly

The producers in the upstream clearing markets are
derivatives clearinghouses, a type of financial market
infrastructure ("FMI") which guarantees the trades of its
members. 1 1 6 If a member is unable to fulfill its obligations
under a trade, the clearinghouse will step in. Membership is
determined by complicated criteria subject to regulatory
constraint. 117
By their very design, clearinghouses exhibit strong
economies of scale-so strong, in fact, that clearinghouses
can be classified as natural monopolies. 18 A natural
115

See infra notes 192-194 and accompanying text.

On FMIs, see generally BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG.
OF SEC. COMM'RS, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES
116

(2012), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z2DBJPWP]; Supervision and Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures:
About, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYs. (last updated Sept. 2, 2009),

http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/overabout.htm
[https://perma.cc/UTW9-TS5X]. The most well-known FMIs are credit
cards, such as Visa, and payment messaging systems, such as SWIFT. See
Supervision and Oversight of FinancialMarket Infrastructures: PrivateSector Systems, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYs. (last updated Jan. 29,
2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystemslover-pssystems.ht

m [https://perma.cc/QK52-6KMH].
117 Such constraints include an open access mandate. See 17 C.F.R.

§ 39.12(a)(1)

(2016). For limitations on capital
membership, see 17 C.F.R. § 39.12(a)(2)(iii) (2016).

requirements

for

118 The notion that clearinghouses are natural monopolies is not
universally accepted. Compare Chang, supra note 14, with HASENPUSCH,
supra note 35, at 50. See also RUBEN LEE, RUNNING THE WORLD'S MARKETS:
THE GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 20-21 (2011); DERMOT
TURING, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE § 6.41 (2012); Lin & Surti,
supra note 35, at 5.
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monopoly arises when a market is more efficiently serviced
by one producer than multiple ones.119 Common examples of
natural monopoly occur in industries such as utilities and
telecommunications, which rely heavily on infrastructure.
Commentators have also observed FMIs, as infrastructures
0
themselves, to be natural monopolies.12 For clearinghouses
in particular, marginal costs decrease when the intermediary
grows, due to its ability to perform two significant trading
functions: netting and compression.
Netting occurs when a clearinghouse offsets member
positions. If, for instance, member A owes member B $1
million on a trade, member B owes member C $1 million on
another trade, and member C owes member A $2 million on
a third trade, a clearinghouse can net all three trades into
one clean result: member C owes member A $1 million.
Accordingly, member A and member B may not have to post
additional margin, or collateral, on these trades. Overall, the
margin that members must post to trade diminishes, since
the clearinghouse can tap more positions to offset against

one another.121
Compression, also known as trade "tear ups," is the
1 22
replacement of a large trade with a set of smaller trades.
The fundamental benchmark of a derivatives trade is its
notional amount-or the face amount of the contract which
acts as the basis for exchange of payments. By way of
illustration, if the counterparties to a $5 million (notional)
trade have offsetting positions, a clearinghouse can compress
the trade by replacing it with a trade whose notional is $1
119 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE EcONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS 123-24 (The MIT Press 1988) (1971).
120 See, e.g., Thanh Tu Nguyen, EC Antitrust Law in Payment Card
Systems 13-14 (Mar. 8, 2003) (unpublished master thesis, Lund

University), http://lup.lub.1u.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&record

Old=1554679&fileOld=1563407 [https://perma.cc/J7UE-PY5S].
121 For a nuanced analysis of netting, see Roe, supra note 27, at 1660-

62.
122 See INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES AsS'N, INTEREST RATE SWAPS
COMPRESSION: A PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2012).
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million.12 3 The counterparties benefit because the payments
they exchange with one another diminish-for example, if
one counterparty owes the other 20% of the notional, that
payment will be $200,000 under the compressed trade ($1
million notional), as opposed to $1 million under the original
trade ($5 million notional). Regulators favor compression
because it lowers the notional amounts floating in the
derivatives markets, thereby lowering the exposure of
trading counterparties. 12 4
Due to the network effects of established clearinghouses,
potential competitors find it very difficult to penetrate the
clearing markets. This pattern has been seen with other
FMIs; indeed, the history of payment systems reveals that
network effects can quickly propel an early-mover FMI into a
dominant one. 12 5 As an established FMI grows, it becomes
increasingly cheaper for the FMI to serve existing customers
and attract new ones. Marginal cost decreases because the
network attracts customers. 12 6 This trait is even more
pronounced with nontraditional infrastructures such as a
clearinghouse; hard infrastructures, such as roads and

123
124

See id.
See triReduce Portfolio Compression: Optimizing Leverage Ratios

and Reducing Risk, TRIOPTIMA http://www.trioptima.com/uploading-image
s/pdf/triReduce%20EU.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GRB-7MLU].
125 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 85, at 313-14 (futures
clearinghouses);
DOJ COMMENT, supra note 28 at 10 (futures

clearinghouses); Nandini Sukumar & Matthew Leising, LCH.Clearnet in
Talks to Buy Nasdaq's Rate Clearinghouse, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 24,
2012, 10:24 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-24/1chclearnet-in-discussion-to-buy-nasdaq-s-rate-clearinghouse

[https://perma.cc/E884-XQPU] (IRS clearinghouse); Adam J. Levitin,
Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55
UCLA L. Rev. 1321, 1327 (2008) (credit cards); Publication of an
Undertaking: Case No IV/36.120 - La Poste/SWIFT + GUF, 1997 O.J.
(C335) 3, 4 (EC) (SWIFT).
126 See LEE, supra note 118, at 71-72 (illustrating the interplay of
network effects, economies of scale, and switching costs in the market

power of one type of FMI).
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telephone networks, face capacity issues,'2 7 but FMIs do not
tend to become congested. An established clearinghouse can
also fend off potential competitors because members of the
incumbent clearinghouse can trade so cheaply, due to netting
and compression.
2. Defining the Market
This Subsection defines the upstream clearing markets
for two types of OTC derivatives-IRS 128 and CDS.1 29 They
traded in
OTC derivatives,
are the paradigmatic
sophisticated markets directly affected by the Dodd-Frank
central clearing mandate.so During the second half of 2015,
IRS comprised roughly 58.6% of all OTC derivatives; IRS are
the largest subset of interest rate derivatives, which occupy
80.0% of the OTC derivatives market."' CDS occupy roughly
2.3% of the OTC derivatives market. 13 2
127 See BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF
SHARED RESOURCES 3-4 (2012).
128 IRS are derivatives where the referent asset is the fluctuation of
interest rates. For instance, assume that a borrower takes out a loan at a
rate of LIBOR plus 3%, at a time when LIBOR is hovering around 2%.
LIBOR fluctuates up and down. To manage the volatility, the borrower
(whom we'll call "Buyer") purchases an IRS from a financial institution
(whom we'll call "Seller"), pursuant to which Buyer pays Seller a fixed
interest rate of 5% on Buyer's loan, and Seller pays Buyer the variable
interest rate of LIBOR plus 3%.
129 CDS are derivatives whose referent asset is the potential default
on another obligation. Assume that a borrower takes out a loan from a
bank. To hedge against the possibility of the borrower's default, the bank
(whom we'll call "Buyer") might purchase a CDS from a financial
institution ("Seller"), pursuant to which Seller will pay Buyer the face
amount of the borrower's loan in the event that the borrower defaults.
130 See INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, SWAPS INFO 2014 YEAR IN
REVIEW (2015) [hereinafter ISDA, 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW]; FinancialReform
GOLDMAN
SACHS
(2012),
Central
Clearing,
Dodd-Frank
http://www.goldmansachs.com/gsam/worldwide/insights/FinReg/clearingfact-sheet-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L93Q-H5LR].
131 See Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS, tbl. D5 (2016), http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm
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Traditionally, market power analysis begins with market
definition. It is axiomatic that market power is a firm's
ability to increase profits by reducing output and charging a
supracompetitive price for its products.13 3 Mathematically,
market power can be expressed as a relationship between
price and marginal cost, where the larger the markup of
price over marginal cost, the greater the firm's market
power.134 Alternatively, market power can be expressed as an
inverse relationship with the firm's elasticity of demand. 13 5
However, marginal cost and elasticity of demand are
notoriously difficult to pin down, so quantifying market
power usually defaults to the surrogate of (i) defining the
relevant market and then (ii) measuring the market share of
the scrutinized firms. 1 3 6
Customarily, market definition unfolds in two parts: the
relevant product market and the relevant geographical
market.1 37 The product market is calibrated to the smallest
grouping of sales where the elasticities of demand and
supply are low enough that a monopolist controlling the
grouping
could
reduce
output
and
increase
price

[https://perma.ccIQ7RB-SW3J] (follow link to "Foreign exchange, interest
rate, equity linked contracts" for the "H2 2015" statistics). IRS are the
bulk of interest rate derivatives (75.2%). Other types of interest rate
derivatives include forward rate agreements and options. See id.
132 See id. (follow link to "Commodity contracts, credit default swaps"

for the "H2 2015" statistics) [https://perma.cc/Q5JM-YV5P].
133 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.1.
134 This is the Lerner index: L = (P - MC)/P, where P denotes price
and MC marginal cost. See Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 939-41;
Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, supra note 36, at 445-46.
135 L = -1/Ed, where Ed is the firm's demand curve. Kaplow, Why
(Ever) Define Markets?, supra note 36, at 446.

136 See id. at 446-48. Of course, measuring market share is a tricky
endeavor. Its predicate step of market definition is prone to ambiguity,
and its value as an approximation for market power has come under fire
time after time. See supra note 108.
137 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.1d, at 92.
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substantially above marginal cost. 13 8 The definition of the
relevant geographical market unfolds along similar lines.1 39
Derivatives markets complicate market definition in
several ways. First, clearing markets tend toward
amalgamation, while the underlying products remain nonfungible. This tension is one of the fundamental challenges
to the central clearing mandate because non-fungible
products are difficult to clear.14 0 Second, evidence suggests
that the IRS and CDS markets are fragmenting along
geographic lines. 1 41 The implications of these two trends will
be discussed in turn.
By nature, clearing markets gravitate toward one
naturally monopolistic provider. For example, a dominant
clearinghouse of IRS can harness its network effects to
maintain dominance over the market. 14 2 By contrast, the
underlying products-the derivatives themselves-might be
highly customized. Derivatives are often designed and sold
as customized products; buyers of derivatives for hedging
purposes want products tailored to a narrow risk profile,
while buyers for speculative purposes want to bet on a
narrow set of circumstances.1 43 Either way, these

&

138 Id. at § 3.2, at 92. Over time, this grouping has acquired the
shorthand SSNIP: "small but significant and nontransitory increase in
price." Id. at § 3.2, at 93 n.2.
139 Market definition arguably accounts for the geographical market
in a much more rigorous way than do alternative theories. See Louis
Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis and a Direct
Adjustment Alternative, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1835-45 (1982); Landes
Posner, supra note 108, at 963-71.
140 See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 49 (statement of Bill Hill,
Morgan Stanley) (distinguishing between the clearing of a liquid, easy-tovalue single-name CDS based on a corporate obligation versus the clearing
of an illiquid, difficult-to-value single-name CDS based on sovereign debt).
141 See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 120 and accompanying text; see also Darrell Duffie
& Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce
CounterpartyRisk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74, 76 (2011).
143 For instance, the referent in a CDS might be whether a certain
entity (e.g., a sovereign country or a large corporation) defaults on an
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transactions are intricately customized and inimitable
trades.
The customization of derivatives products is salient not
just for the trading market, where these products are sold;
the consequences of customization also spill over to the
adjacent clearing market. Some IRS and CDS are simply too
unique to be cleared.1 44 Hence, in circumscribing a relevant
product market, we must exclude unclearable derivatives.
Other types of uncleared derivatives, too, should be
excluded. 145
i.

Clearing of Interest Rate Swaps

For IRS clearing, the relevant product market is most
appropriately defined as the entire worldwide market for
cleared IRS. Unclearable IRS, as well as IRS trades exempt
from the clearing mandate, are therefore excluded. An
alternative that defines the product market as all cleared
IRS is too broad, since a clearinghouse cannot functionally
guarantee trades in unclearable products and need not
guarantee trades between counterparties exempt from the

obligation. This would be a "single-name" CDS. Alternatively, the referent
might be whether a group of entities defaults on an obligation (a "multiplename" CDS).
144 See INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES AsS'N, INTEREST RATE SWAPS
DERIVATIVES: A PROGRESS REPORT ON CLEARING AND COMPRESSION (2014)

[hereinafter ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES]; ISDA, 2014 YEAR IN
REVIEW, supra note 130. This is despite the fact that clearinghouses are a
standardizing force on the derivatives markets. The clearing functionality
demands fungibility in derivatives instruments. If a member defaults on a
trade, the clearinghouse auctions off that member's positions; "unwinding"
the trade substitutes the defaulting counterparty with an altogether
unaffiliated party. See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 44 (statement
of Bill Hill, Morgan Stanley).
145 "Unclearable" is not the same as "uncleared." Unclearable trades
cannot be handled by clearinghouses, while uncleared trades might be
clearable but for some reason are not cleared-for instance, trades that are
exempt from the central clearing mandate. Organizations that tabulate
clearing volumes often switch between the two terms.
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clearing mandate. Similarly, defining the market as the
clearing of one specific type of IRS is too narrow.
The worldwide market definition should be fairly
uncontroversial; it has been adopted by the few academics
and industry groups that have sifted through the data
necessary to calculate market shares.14 6 However, several
factors can complicate data analysis. Organizations compile
data to varying levels of granularity. 1 4 7 Further, some
such as the Bank for International
organizations,
Settlements ("BIS"), will double-count cleared derivatives.14 8
In other words, BIS counts a trade between clearinghouse
members A and B as (i) one trade between party A and the
clearinghouse-guarantor and, separately, (ii) one trade
between party B and the clearinghouse-guarantor (see
Figure 1). Given these parameters, another approach is to
focus on the statistics compiled by one organization while
noting its methodological limitations.
In 2014, ISDA undertook an analysis of the interest rate
derivatives clearing market that accounted for trade
compression and uncleared and unclearable products. 9
According to ISDA's calculations, the resulting upstream
was
clearing market for interest rate derivatives

&

146 See ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES, supra note 144, at 2; Lin
Surti, supra note 35, at 37-39. ISDA and Lin & Surti have combed
through data compiled by DTCC, Markit, TriOptima, and BIS, all of which

track notionals slightly differently.
147 See ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES, supra note 144, at 3 n.1
(discussing its methodology, as well as the approaches of BIS and DTCC).
148 See MONETARY & ECON. DEP'T, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, OTC
DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 2014, 11, 18 tbl.4 n.1 (2015),
[https://perma.cc/K74U-8TH4]
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc hyl504.pdf
[hereinafter BIS, 2014 OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS].
149 See ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES, supra note 144, at 2-5. To
be precise, however, it must be noted that ISDA assessed the market for
interest rate derivatives, which are primarily (but not entirely) comprised

of IRS.
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approximately $404 trillion in size as of June 30, 2013.150
Adjusted for double-counting, the size of the cleared IRS
market becomes $202 trillion. 15 1
FIGURE 1: DOUBLE-COUNTING OF CLEARED TRADES

Left: One trade between two clearinghouse members.
Right: The same trade novated to the clearinghouse and then booked as two
trades.

ii. Clearing of Credit Default Swaps
For CDS clearing, market definition is more protean. In
the adjacent trading market, liquidity pools-i.e., trading
activity-for most derivatives have been fracturing for some
time, so instruments based on U.S. referents are traded
primarily among U.S. dealers, and instruments based on
European referents are traded primarily among European
dealers. This trend is most pronounced in the IRS markets,
where in fourth quarter 2014, 87.7% of Euro IRS
transactions
occurred
exclusively
between
European
dealers.15 2 No comparable studies of market fragmentation
150 As of June 30, 2013, clearinghouses were handling approximately
$404 trillion in interest rate derivatives. Id. at 3. Trade compression
eliminated $239 trillion in notionals, resulting in $144-157 trillion in
uncleared products, comprised of unclearable derivatives ($65 trillion),
derivatives products denominated in currencies that cannot be cleared
($10 trillion), and transactions between entities exempt from the clearing
mandates ($36 trillion). Id. at 3-4.

151

Id. at 3.

152 See

INT'L
SWAPS
& DERIVATIVES AsS'N, CROSS-BORDER
FRAGMENTATION OF GLOBAL DERIVATIVES: END-YEAR 2014 UPDATE 2-3
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have been undertaken for the CDS markets; however, at
present, there are two major clearinghouses for CDS, both
operated by the Intercontinental Exchange ("ICE")-ICE
Clear Credit, "the world's first dedicated CDS clearing
house," and ICE Clear Europe, which serves the European
CDS market."'
Fragmentation of the downstream trading market has
not affected the upstream clearing of IRS. As the next
Subsection shows, one giant clearinghouse, SwapClear,
provides the lion's share of clearing services for the world's
IRS trades. Yet the CDS clearing markets are serviced by
two dominant providers, whose footprints are beginning to
splinter along geographic lines.1 54
For now, there is still geographic overlap between the two
ICE clearinghouses. Thus, this Article treats the global
market for CDS clearing as one market rather than
5
partitioning it into a U.S. market and a European market.1
This approach yields a market that, in second quarter 2013,

(2015). As a counterpoint, however, fragmentation in the U.S. dollar IRS
market is subtler. See id. at 9-10.
153 Credit Derivatives, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH.,
https://www.theice
(last visited Dec.
.com/credit-derivatives [https://perma.cc/D46C-37UH]
31, 2016).
154 For products
cleared by each entity, see ICE Clear Credit,
[https://pe
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., https://www.theice.com/clear-credit
rmacc/7FUJ-527W] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016) (follow the link to "CDS
Cleared Contracts"); ICE Clear Europe CDS, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH.,
https://www.theice.com/clear-europe/cds [https://perma.cc/M72W-GMCW]
(last visited Dec. 31, 2016) (follow the link to "CDS Cleared Contracts").
155 This is the approach of Lin & Surti, supra note 35, at 8.
Nonetheless, there are two other possibilities: (i) defining two clearing
markets, corresponding to CDS based on U.S. versus European referents,
and (ii) defining a submarket for European-based CDS within the broader
market for all cleared CDS. Either alternative risks being criticized for
prejudicing the ICE clearinghouses by rendering a finding of high market
share (and, therefore, market power) inevitable. See Kaplow, Why (Ever)
Define Markets?, supra note 36, at 440.
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was $5.171 trillion in size.156 Not adjusted for double
counting, the figure becomes $10.342 trillion.1 57
3.

Calculating Market Shares

In the IRS clearing market, one entity towers above all
else: SwapClear, the IRS clearinghouse owned by
LCH.Clearnet.1 5 1 In 2013, SwapClear processed $391 trillion
of the $404 trillion IRS clearing market (96.8%) (see Table
1).159 By contrast, CME Group cleared $6 trillion (1.49%),
and the Japan Securities Clearing Corporation ("JSCC")
cleared $6.6 trillion (1.63%).00
156 Robust analysis of the CDS clearing market was, until recently,
fairly difficult to come by. For one study breaking down the CDS market
into cleared and uncleared segments, see DEPOSITORY TR. & CLEARING

CORP.,

CENTRALLY

CLEARED

CREDIT

TRADE

ANALYSIS

(2013),

&

&

http://www.dtcc.com/repository-otc-data (follow link to "Centrally Cleared
Credit Trade Analysis") [https://perma.cclWJR3-M83H] (calculating new
cleared trades at $5.171 trillion, or 27.38%, out of a total gross notional of
$18.88 trillion). More recently, the CFTC and OCC have begun to break
down the statistics for cleared and uncleared CDS. However, the CFTC's
data are compiled from reports by four CFTC-registered swap data
repositories ("SDRs") that, though large, do not account for all the SDRs in
existence. See Weekly Swaps Report: Explanatory Notes, CFTC,
http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/SwapsReports/ExplanatoryNotes/index
.htm [https://perma.cc/MZQ7-THP4]. The OCC's data are compiled
primarily from call reports filed by U.S. banks, savings associations, and
financial holding companies. See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at
3. For consistency with the IRS clearing market analysis, this Subsection
examines 2013 figures for the CDS clearing market.
157 DTCC adjusts for double counting. See DEPOSITORY TR.
CLEARING CORP., CENTRALLY CLEARED CREDIT TRADE ANALYSIS (2013),
http://www.dtcc.com/repository-otc-data (follow link to "Explanation of
Centrally Cleared Trade Analysis") [https://perma.cc/LFY9-56H4].
158 For a description of SwapClear's rise to prominence, see Natasha
de Terin, How the World's Largest Default Was Unravelled, FIN. NEWS
(Oct. 13, 2008), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2008-10-13/how-thelargest-default-was-unravelled [http://perma.cclJB66-52TV].
159 ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES, supra note 144, at 3; Lin
Surti, supra note 35, at 8.
160 ISDA, INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES, supra note 144, at 3.
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In the CDS clearing market, ICE Clear Credit and ICE
Clear Europe are the largest clearinghouses. ICE reported
that these two clearinghouses cleared a combined $10.2
trillion in CDS trades in 2012 and $10.7 trillion in 2013.6
This comports with the growth of the overall CDS trading
and clearing markets from 2012 to 2013.162 If we assume
that, in second quarter 2013, the two ICE clearinghouses
handled approximately $10.2 trillion in CDS trades,1 63 then
it becomes clear that these two entities are the dominant
providers, handling 98.6% of centrally cleared CDS trades
($10.342 trillion).164 Compared to the ICE clearinghouses,
the other providers-CME CMDX in North America, Eurex
Credit Clear and LCH.Clearnet SA in Europe, and JSCC and
Tokyo Financial Exchange in Japan-are much smaller.165

161 INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 48 (2015),
http://ir.theice.com/-/media/Files/I/Ice-IR/annual-reports/2014/ice-annualreport-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9ZA-XED4].
162 See INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, CDS MARKET SUMMARY:
MARKET RISK TRANSACTION ACTIVITY 3 Chart 3 (2013) (tracing the growth
of CDS new market activity from $15.0 trillion in 2012 to $17.3 trillion in
2013).
163 Trading in derivatives instruments fluctuates wildly. See Todd
Skarecky, CDS Clearing Data, CLARUS FIN. TECH. (Apr. 14, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/PL8R-C7X5].
http://www.clarusft.com/cds-clearing-data
Data on CDS trading and clearing, therefore, can get murky at times,
depending on the time period analyzed. Another variable is the extent to
which ICE's figures double-count the CDS based on European referents
which are cleared at both ICE Clear Credit and ICE Clear Europe.
164 See supra note 153 and accompanying text; Lin & Surti, supra
note 35, at 8 ("[SwapClear and the two ICE clearinghouses] novate closeto-100 percent of centrally cleared derivatives trades in their respective
markets.").
165 BIS, 2014 OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS, supra note 148, at 11 n.6.
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TABLE 1: MARKET SHARES FOR THE DOMINANT IRS AND
CDS CLEARINGHOUSES ("CHS")
Market
Notionals
Dominant
Notionals: All
Clearing
Share
in
Cleared
("DCH")
CH
Trades
Cleared
Market
DCH ,
of DCH
IRS
$404 trillion
SwapClear
$391 trillion
96.8%
CDS
$10.342 trillion
ICE Clear
$10.2
98.6%
Credit & ICE
trillion
Clear Europe

The dominance of SwapClear, ICE Clear Credit, and ICE
Clear
Europe
corroborates
the
hypothesis
that
clearinghouses are natural monopolies. By all estimates, the
clearing markets for OTC derivatives are poised to grow as
more trades fall into the scope of the central clearing
mandate.1 6 6 This trend will only strengthen the lock of
SwapClear and ICE on market share; with time, these
entities will enjoy greater revenue and be able to net even
more trades.
However, for a conclusion of high market power, two
other variables are relevant: the elasticity of consumer
demand and the elasticity of rivals' supply.1 67 Consideration
of these two factors shows that the relationship between
market share and market power is more nuanced than a
straightforward tautology. Although difficult to measure
directly, both sets of demand can be easily estimated as
fairly inelastic. In the clearing markets, consumers (i.e.,
traders) must have their trading activities centrally cleared,
with few exceptions. 1 6 8 Consumers cannot seamlessly switch
between clearinghouses because network effects make it
See, e.g., ISDA, 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 130, at 3, 12.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 108, at 939-47.
168 Dodd-Frank includes exceptions for some end-users as well as
hedging purposes. Critics have charged that these exceptions are large
enough to frustrate the spirit behind the law. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher,
Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging with Credit
Derivatives, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 855, 875-76 (2014); William F.
Kroener III, Dodd-Frank FinancialReform and Its Impact on the Banking
Industry, SS038 ALI-ABA 247, 260 (2010).
166
167

No. 3:657]

SECOND-GENERATION MONOPOLIZATION

695

expensive to choose smaller providers. Thus, the elasticity of
demand is low. Antitrust sometimes takes comfort in
competition for a market, even if there is little competition
within a market.16 9 But regulation erects such high barriers
to entry that the few insurgent firms managing to register as
clearing organizations will have a difficult time wrenching
away market share from incumbents.17 0 Hence, the elasticity
of supply is low. These patterns are consistent with our
observations that the clearing markets are dominated by
natural monopolies.

B. The Dealer Markets
1. Concentration and Oligopoly Characteristics
The downstream dealer market is characterized by a high
degree of concentration among an oligopoly of four or five
large dealers-who, incidentally, happen to be highly
regulated banks and bank holding companies. In the United
States, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")
7
publishes quarterly reports on bank derivatives positions.
These reports reveal that the same institutions always top
the list: since 2000, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Citibank, and
Bank of America (or their predecessors) have ranked among
the largest five dealers. 17 2 Goldman Sachs Bank joined that
169

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 1.4b, at 34.

170 For

the
compliance
obligations
of derivatives
clearing
organizations, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection

Act Title VIII, 12 U.S.C. § 5461 et seq. (2015). But see Crane, supra note
37, at 34 (arguing that exclusion is most concerning not where entry
barriers are high, but in a zone of middling power where entry barriers are
surmountable absent anticompetitive conduct). Professor Crane's insight
is more relevant to the dealer markets than the clearing markets.
171 See Quarterly Report on Bank DerivativesActivities, OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capitalmarkets/financial-markets/derivatives/derivatives-quarterly-Report.html

[https://perma.cc/DT6N-W3K7] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
172 See, e.g., OCC, 2014 Q1 REPORT, supra note 35, at tbl.1; OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
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list during the financial crisis.173 In its first quarter 2016
report, the OCC noted that "[a] small group of large financial
institutions continues to dominate derivative activity in the
U.S. commercial banking system. During the first quarter of
2016, four large commercial banks [the above four]
represented 91.0 percent of the total banking industry
notional amounts."1 74
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2010 tbl.1 (2010),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-

markets/derivatives/dq110.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SW5-C78H] [hereinafter
OCC, 2010 Q1 REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
OCC's QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST
QUARTER 2006 tbl.1
(2006), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capitalmarkets/financial-markets/derivatives/dql06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RD8TLZ4V]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BANK
DERIVATIVES REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 2002 tbl.1 (2002), https://www.occ.tre
as.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/dq102.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HKR-WJZ3]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, OCC BANK DERIVATIVES REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 2000 tbl.1
(2000), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/
derivatives/dqlOO.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVE4-9NQ7].
173 See, e.g., OCC, 2014 Q1 REPORT, supra note 35, at tbl.1; OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2013 tbl.1 (2013),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/
derivatives/dq113.pdf [https://perma.cc/87WY-FJ2J]
[hereinafter OCC,
2013 Q1 REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC'S
QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST
QUARTER 2012 tbl.1 (2012),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capitalmarkets/financial-markets/derivatives/dql12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HS5SR94B] [hereinafter OCC, 2012 Q1 REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
OF THE CURRENCY, OCC'S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND
DERIVATIVES
ACTIVITIES,
FIRST
QUARTER
2011
tbl.1
(2011),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financialmarkets/derivatives/dq111.pdf [https://perma.cc/32XH-G2AZ] [hereinafter
OCC, 2011 Q1 REPORT]; OCC 2010 Q1 REPORT, supra note 172, at tbl.1;
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY REPORT
ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2009 tbl.1
(2009), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/

derivatives/dq109.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8XA-G3Z4] [hereinafter OCC,
2009 Q1REPORT].
174 OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at 3.
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Facially, at least, a combined market share this high for
the largest four dealers (the "four-firm concentration ratio"
or "CR4") far exceeds commonly held thresholds for a tight
oligopoly."' This degree of concentration confers to the top
dealers the greatest cut of the lucrative derivatives trading
revenues, which can reach $7-8 billion per quarter. 76
However, as the rest of this Subsection explores,
concentration in the dealer markets is more complex than
the CR4 would suggest.
Concentration has been alleged to be the consequence of
central clearing-specifically, the control that dominant
of
facility
indispensable
the
over
exert
dealers
clearinghouses. 17 JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Goldman
Sachs Bank, and Bank of America are all members of
1 78
If
SwapClear, ICE Clear Credit, and ICE Clear Europe.

set high bars to clearinghouse
these institutions
membership, then rival dealers will be unable to gain
entry 1 79 -a scenario that appears to be playing out because

175 See, e.g., William G. Shepherd, Concentration Ratios, in 1 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF EcoNOMICS 563 (John Eatwell, Murray

Mulgate & Peter Newman eds., 1st ed. 1987) (combined concentration
ratio of 90%); DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES 6 (1968) (75%).
176 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's
QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, SECOND
QUARTER 2015 graph 9 (2015), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-

markets/financial-markets/derivatives/dq215.pdf [https://perma.cclH2KCS8RY]. In recent years, trading revenues have comprised, on average, 1013% of the gross revenues for the top four banks. See id. at graph 10. For
Goldman Sachs, a bank with a long history of trading, revenues have
reached as high as 65-71% of gross revenues. See id.
177 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 104, § 763.
178 See Our ClearingMembers, SWAPCLEAR,
http://www.swapclear.co
m/service/our-members.html [https://perma.cc/6RE8-KD75] (last visited
Dec. 31, 2016); ICE Clear Credit Participant List, INTERCONTINENTAL
EXCHANGE, https://www.theice.com/clear-credit/participants [https://perma
.cclYQ8Y-FCMT] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
179 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 45, at 224.
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the membership profile of the dominant IRS and CDS
clearinghouses has remained unchanged from year to year.so
It would be as if, returning to our prior analogy, the four
dominant airlines set the access criteria for LAX so high as
to exclude smaller airlines."' LAX is a labyrinthine
infrastructure run nearly at cost by the issuance of bonds
subject to voluminous disclosures.' 82 Yet, it is also a
bottleneck for air traffic into Los Angeles and can be
manipulated to suppress competition in the airlines market,
where the real revenues lie. 183
Before charges of exclusion can be leveled, though,
market power must be assessed. It turns out that market
definition and the calculation of market shares are even
trickier for the downstream dealer markets than for the
upstream clearing markets. There are strong disagreements
over whether the dealer markets truly are concentrated.
From the OCC's viewpoint, a perennial four-firm oligopoly
cornering over 90% of the trading market means that the
market is concentrated." However, ISDA, the derivatives
dealer trade group, maintains that trading is a global
market, and when dealer notionals are evaluated from a
global perspective, concentration diminishes.' At the other
end, the BIS gauges dealer concentration by slicing the
market into discrete products-for example, IRS based on
the U.S. dollar, Canadian dollar, euro, Swiss franc, Sterling,
180 See infra Section IV.A.
181 Coincidentally, air traffic through LAX is dominated by four
carriers. See Los ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TOP 10 CARRIERS,
JANUARY
2015
THROUGH AUGUST
2015, L.A. WORLD AIRPORTS,
http://www.lawa.org/uploadedfiles/LAX/statistics/aircarrier-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cclR3JY-G8H3].
182 See Airport Basics, L.A. WORLD AIRPORTS, http://www.lawa.org/our
LAX/ourLAX.aspx?id=9143 [https://perma.cc/JG5J-VER2]
(last visited
Dec. 31, 2016).
183 Cf. CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 47 (statement of Jason
Kastner, Vice Chairman, Swaps and Derivatives Markets Association).
184 See supra notes 170, 172, 174.
185 See Mengle, supra note 35, at 1-3, 5.
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Swedish krona, and Japanese yen.186 The result,
counterintuitively, is that concentration is rather low.' 87
Consistent with Professor Kaplow's analysis, both sides of
the debate define the market in the way that best supports
their respective arguments. 88
Even if the market is concentrated, explanations for this
result might vary. First, CDS dealers have historically been
large, well-capitalized financial institutions because default
on an underlying obligation can require the dealer to pay a
substantial amount to close out the position. 18 ' Dealers
hedge their positions by entering into offsetting swaps with
other large, well-capitalized financial institutions-thereby
consolidating the notionals, as well as the risks, within a
small circle of big banks.1 90
Second, derivatives products, in particular IRS, may be
purchased as a condition for obtaining a loan. 91 In lending to
a borrower at a variable rate, a bank might ask that the
borrower take out an IRS so as to mitigate the volatility of
fluctuating rates and protect the bank's interest in the

186

See BIS, 2014 OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS, supra note 148, at 23

tbl.9a.
187
188

See id.
See Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, supra note 36, at 470-74.

1s9 ROBERT E. LITAN, INITIATIVE ON Bus. & PUB. POLICY AT BROOKINGS,
THE DERIVATIVES DEALERS' CLUB AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS REFORM: A
GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS, CITIZENS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES 28

(2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0407_deriv
atives_1itan.pdf [https://perma.ccV8P6-XL8W]. See also CDS Antitrust
Litig. Markit Mem., supra note 95, at 5 (describing the "cliff risks" of
CDS).
190 LITAN, supra note 189, at 28.

191 For empirical evidence on the prevalence of tying, see generally
AsS'N OF FIN. PROF'LS, 2004 CREDIT ACCESS SURVEY: LINKING CORPORATE
CREDIT TO THE AWARDING OF OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES 4 (June 2004);
CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, TYING AND OTHER POTENTIALLY
UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES IN THE RETAIL FINANCIAL SERVICE SECTOR

12, 14-16 (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2010/tying/docs/
report-en.pdf [https://perma.cc[YY87-3NJT].
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underlying credit. 19 2 Coincidentally, three of the top
derivatives dealers are also the nation's largest commercial
banks: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citibank.'
This coincidence might be the result of decisions by
borrowers to purchase swaps from well-capitalized dealers,
or it might be attributed to the tying of swaps to loans-a
requirement that the lender imposes upon the borrower to
buy swaps from an affiliate of the lender.194
For our purposes, the above details affect how the market
is defined to either validate or dispel claims of concentration.
How broadly we draw the geographic and product markets
affects our perspective on concentration. So, too, does how we
account for the market shares of (i) large lending institutions
that are smaller participants in the derivatives trading
market and, conversely, (ii) large derivatives dealers that are
smaller participants in the lending market. In defining the
dealer market and then calculating the market shares, the
remainder of this Subsection addresses these considerations.
2. Defining the Market
i.

The Product Market

The easiest way to define the byzantine dealer market is
to proceed, as above, with a straightforward analysis of the
192 See Anti-Tying Restrictions of Section 106 of the Bank Holding
Company Act Amendments of 1970, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,024, 52,032 (Aug. 29,
2003).
193 See Statistical
Release, FED. RESERVE BD., INSURED U.S.CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT HAVE CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300
MILLION OR MORE, RANKED BY CONSOLIDATED ASSETS, AS OF JUNE 30, 2015
(2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/20150630/lrgbnk-1st.pd
f [https://perma.cc/68WR-Q2MP).
194 If so, then commercial banks are leveraging their dominance in the
lending market (where, these days, low interest rates constrict return on
investment) into dominance in the dealer market (where the profits are
much greater). See Felix B. Chang, Death to Credit as Leverage. Using the
Bank Anti-Tying Provision to Curb FinancialRisk, 9 NYU J. L. & Bus.
851, 903-05 (2013).
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relevant product and geographic markets. 1 95 The central
question in defining the product market is whether we look
at the dealer market for all derivatives or whether we define
the market around specific products. The OCC examines
notional amounts for all derivatives, as well as futures
(exchange-traded), 9 6 options (OTC and exchange-traded),197
forwards (OTC),"' spot foreign exchange,1 99 swaps (OTC),
and credit derivatives (OTC).2 00 BIS breaks down the
markets into even smaller slivers-e.g., IRS by referent
currency.201
This Article opts to combine all IRS into one market and
all CDS into another market so as to align with the product
market definition for clearing services. In doing so, this
Article uses OCC data on notional amounts for the "swaps"
and "credit derivatives" categories, which correspond closely
(but not perfectly) to IRS and CDS.202 For the largest dealers,

See supra Section III.A.2.
A future is the obligation to buy or sell a position at a
predetermined price (the "strike" price).
197 An option is the right to buy or sell a position when the value of
that position attains the strike price. Options can either be exchangetraded or OTC.
198 Like futures, a forward is the obligation to buy or sell at a
preordained strike price; however, forwards are customized and traded
over-the-counter, rather than on exchanges.
199 A spot foreign exchange is a one-time foreign exchange (i.e.,
currency exchange) transaction between two parties.
195

196

200 OCC, 2016
201

Q1 REPORT,

supra note 76, at tbl.1.

See BIS, 2014 OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS, supra note 148, at

tbl.9a.
202 The correspondence is imperfect because "swaps," as used by the
OCC, is slightly broader than IRS. The OCC's figures for swaps are taken
from call reports that group the figures for interest rate, foreign exchange,
equity, commodity, and other swaps together. See FED. FIN. INSTS.

EXAMINATION COUNCIL, INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF CONSOLIDATED
REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME, Item 14.e, at RC-L-17, http://www.ffie

c.gov/pdf/ffiec forms/ffiecO31_034inst_200006.pdf [https://perma.cc/93JHHLBE]. See also OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT supra note 76, at 13-14.
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IRS constitute 77.2-93.5% of swap notionals.2 0 3 CDS make
up 95.0% of all credit derivative notionals.20 4
Beyond antitrust, the tendency of financial regulators is
to aggregate notionals for all derivatives products (exchangetraded and OTC) in order to generate an easy snapshot of
derivatives notionals as compared to assets held. This
snapshot helps regulators gauge the extent of leverage.20 5
Yet this is too broad a perspective for our purposes. 2 0 6
Alternatively, it might make sense to define the product
market around all OTC derivatives, since the dealers that
dominate the IRS and CDS markets also dominate the OTC
forwards and options markets.20 7 Because clearinghouses
have the capacity to net across different instruments-and
will likely do so in the future-amalgamating all OTC
derivatives into one market anticipates that shift in the
upstream market.20 8
203 See Citibank, N.A., CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND
INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OFFICES-FFIEC 031 44

(June 30, 2016) (Item 13, Schedule RC-L); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK WITH
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OFFICEs-FFIEC 031 44 (June 30, 2016) (Item 13,
Schedule RC-L); Bank of America, N.A., CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF
CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OFFICES-

FFIEC 031 44 (June 30, 2016) (Item 13, Schedule RC-L); Goldman Sachs
Bank USA, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK
WITH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OFFICEs-FFIEC 031 44 (June 30, 2016)
(Item 13, Schedule RC-L) (all reports available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/publi
c/ManageFacsimiles.aspx). Note that these figures are taken from the call
reports for the large commercial banks rather than bank holding
companies. For the significance of the distinction between these two types
of financial institutions, see infra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.
204 OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at 13. For a breakdown by

bank, see also id. at tbl. 12.
See, e.g., id. at tbl.1.
On the other hand, BIS defines the market too narrowly, by
carving up IRS into referent products. See supra notes 186-187 and
accompanying text.
207 See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at tbl.1.
208 See, e.g., Duffie & Zhu, supra note 142, at 90 (arguing that a
universal clearinghouse which can net across assets maximizes netting
205

206
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An ancillary question is whether the product market
should track dealers which are commercial banks. Given
that IRS and CDS might be tied to loans,20 9 trading at the
commercial banks would seem the appropriate benchmark.
However, this Article argues that the market should be
defined around the trading activities of bank holding
companies ("BHCs"). A BHC is a company that owns or
controls one or more banks; 2 10 the subsidiaries might be
engaged in commercial lending, or they might be engaged in
other activities, such as investing or selling insurance.
Today, with tighter capital adequacy requirements for
banks,"' derivatives trading activity has migrated away
from commercial banks and into the realm of other
affiliates.2 12 Notional amounts at the BHC level illustrate
this movement.21 3
Although trading figures for commercial banks create the
impression of a four-firm oligopoly, 2 14 the figures for BHCs
reveal instead that five firms have cornered the dealer
market: JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Bank
of America, and Morgan Stanley. 215 A five-firm oligopoly is
more difficult to condemn than a four-firm one since

&

efficiency). At the very least, however, the demarcation between exchangetraded and OTC derivatives should be preserved because the clearing and
trading of exchange-traded products is quite different. See Wolkoff
Werner, supra note 85.
209 See supra notes 191-194 and accompanying text.
210 See National Information Center, All Institution Types Defined,
FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/Co

ntent/HELP/Institution%2Type%2ODescription.htm [https://perma.cc/P7
RF-5BGB] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
211 See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE
RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2011).
212 See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at 4-5.
213 Compare id. at 4 tbl.1, with id. at 4 tbl.2 (revealing that
derivatives notionals are typically higher at the BHC level than the
commercial bank level for most institutions). See also id. at 5 fig. 1.
214 See id. at tbl.1.
215 See id. at tbl.2.
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exclusionary schemes will be harder to create and enforce
among five players compared to four.216 Nonetheless, this is
the more accurate approach; as Section III.C demonstrates,
clearinghouse membership rosters always include Morgan
Stanley, in addition to affiliates of the large commercial
banks. Morgan Stanley, like Goldman Sachs, had
traditionally been an investment bank that, during the
financial crisis, reorganized into a BHC with a commercial
bank subsidiary to avail itself of federal funds.2 1 7
ii. The Geographic Market

This Article advocates carving out the United States as a
standalone geographic derivatives market.21 8 Derivatives
dealers can trade across distances easily, but their
consumers' preferences tend to be more local. 2 1 9 For example,
the trading activities of HSBC North America Holdings, Inc.
("HSBC") reflect the localized nature of the dealer market. A
subsidiary of the London-based HSBC Holdings plc, HSBC
ranks sixth in its total derivatives notionals according to the

216 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1230 (stating that oligopoly
size is important in determining the stability of parallel exclusion).
217 See Michael J. de la Merced et al., As Goldman and Morgan Shift,
a Wall St. Era Ends, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 21, 2008, 9:35 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-become-bankholding-companies [https://perma.cc/T35A-HWTJ]. Today, Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley have diverged slightly in that most of Goldman
Sachs' trading activities are undertaken at the commercial bank level,
while most of Morgan Stanley's trading activities are conducted outside
the commercial bank. Compare OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at
tbl.1, with id. at tbl.2.
218 Clearing markets, by contrast, are global because netting can be
performed rather effortlessly across borders; clearinghouses also draw
members from large financial institutions around the world. See infra
Section III.C.
219 For instance, a Dallas-based airline might purchase an oil swap
from a Houston- or Chicago-based dealer; the dealer itself will hedge its
exposure with one of the dominant U.S.-based dealers.
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OCC.2 20 While HSBC is a global player in the financial
markets, especially in Europe and Asia, its position is far
weaker in the United States. Indeed, affiliates of HSBC are
members of every major clearinghouse,2 2 1 but their market
share within the United States cannot compare with the
shares of the large U.S. dealers.2 2 2 Thus, the dealer markets
are most appropriately defined as the overall market for IRS
and the overall market for CDS-or, alternatively, all OTC
derivatives-sold in the United States.
Currently, the OCC's quarterly reports are the best
source on the size of dealer markets. Relying on the OCC's
methodology, however, is vulnerable to criticism because the
OCC's methodology factors in the global trading activity of
U.S. dealers and it fails to account for the U.S. trading
activity of dealers domiciled outside the United States.22 3 In
the absence of data focusing solely on activity in the U.S.
geographic market, we must contend with the OCC's
numbers, along with all its drawbacks. Regarding the role of
non-U.S. dealers, that concern is less powerful-consumers
of derivatives products purchase from the providers in their
local or national market. Further, if the tying of swaps to
loans is prevalent,2 24 then it is all the more likely that
derivatives are sold by affiliates of the local or national
lender.2 2 5
From the OCC's numbers, we can calculate the sizes of
the dealer markets as approximately $139.603 trillion for
220 OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at tbl.2. HSBC's swaps
notionals total $5.733 trillion, compared with $15.899 trillion for fifthranked Morgan Stanley, and HSBC's credit derivatives total $185 billion,
compared with $1.412 trillion for fifth-ranked Morgan Stanley. Id.
221 See infra Section III.C.
222 See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at tbls.1 & 2.
223 Mengle, supra note 35, at 1-2.
224 See supra notes 191-194 and accompanying text.
225 But see Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How
Derivatives Changed the "Business of Banking", 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041,
1041-42 (2009) (chronicling how the OCC broadened the business of
banking concept to cover dealing in financial risk).
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swaps (i.e., IRS), $10.820 trillion for credit derivatives (i.e.,
CDS), and $225.316 trillion for all OTC derivatives (see
Table 2).226
TABLE 2: ASSETS AND NOTIONAL AMOUNTS (IN MILLIONS
OF DOLLARS) FOR SELECTED U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
("BHC") IN DESCENDING ORDER OF RANK 227
BH

Total'
Aeet BUC

Ttl
'Totlbe

OTCOCredit
w
sw OT
Derivatives Derivative>

AIlOTC.

1. Citigroup

1,800,967

55,624,082

30,518,526

2,081,895

47,833,660

2. JPMorgan
Chase
3. Goldman
Sachs
4. Bank of
America
5. Morgan
Stanley
6. HSBC NA

2,423,808

52,352,138

29,019,815

3,136,988

49,946,925

878,102

52,257,748

28,818,811

1,979,810

45,682,587

2,188,633

42,998,807

23,890,121

1,964,913

39,381,707

807,497

28,281,106

15,899,169

1,412,322

25,456,239

289,057

7,611,043

5,773,336

184,616

6,863,887

7. Wells
Fargo
8. State
Street
9. BNY
Mellon B

1,849,182

5,908,234

4,012,949

29,207

5,548,936

243,685

1,341,462

11,505

37

1,328,140

372,870

1,032,454

352,635

405

996,003

Top 25 BHCs
CombinedII

14,116,151

250,182,837

139,602,766

10,819,542

225,316,150

226 OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at tbl.2. Importantly, these
figures are not adjusted for double-counting from inter-dealer
transactions. See Mengle, supra note 35, at 1. The OCC pulls these
numbers from the call reports filed by banks and BHCs. Therefore, if
Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase have entered into a $10 million
trade, the trade will be reported by both parties in their call reports, for a
total of $20 million.
227 The figures are taken from OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76,
at tbl.2. Dealers ranked 6-9 are included for comparative purposes.
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3. Calculating Market Shares
Market shares at the BHC level show that a five-firm
oligopoly has cornered well over 91% of the relevant markets
(see Table 3).228
TABLE 3: MARKET SHARES FOR THE DOMINANT U.S.
DEALERS
OTC Credit
BHC Fop5) OC Saps
BHC(To 5 OT Swps
Derivatives Derivatives
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Citigroup
JPMorgan Chase
Goldman Sachs
Bank of America
Morgan Stanley

21.86%
20.79%
20.64%
17.11%
11.39%

19.24%
28.99%
18.30%
18.16%
13.05%

All OTC
21.23%
22.17%
20.27%
17.48%
11.30%

But what do these market shares mean? Asked another
way, what insights can we glean about market power from
the fact that this much of the market belongs to the top five
dealers? Without some archetype for appropriate market
concentration, these numbers are meaningless. 229
Fortunately, market share need not be assessed in a
vacuum. Other factors demonstrate the market power that
these five firms exercise. 230 As we shall see, there might be
23 1
but
intense competition within the five-member oligopoly,

228

Id.

This is one of Professor Kaplow's most emphatic critiques of the
market definition/market share paradigm. See Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define
Markets?, supra note 36, at 459-62; see also Crane, supra note 37, at 35229

39.
230 Context is important; a five-firm oligopoly in derivatives trading
reflects different dynamics than a five-firm oligopoly in other industries.
Antitrust devises tools such as anticompetitive effects and procompetitive
justifications that inform this context.
231 See CDS Antitrust Litig. Dealer Joint Mot., supra note 94, at 28
("[T]here are no factual allegations that the twelve dealer-defendants
failed to compete with each other in their OTC trading of CDS (to the
contrary, they compete fiercely).").
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the oligopoly might nonetheless stifle competition from
smaller dealers.
An analysis of market concentration can forecast the
behavior of the five dealers. Decades ago, the prevailing
measure of concentration was the four-firm concentration
ratio ("CR4").2 32 Measured at the BHC level, the CR4 is

80.40% for IRS, 84.69% for CDS, and 81.15% for all OTC
derivatives.2 3 3 These CR4s surpass the thresholds at which
exacting scrutiny of mergers is triggered. A CR4 greater
than 75% is ostensibly so high that a market is presumed to
be conducive to coercion.2 3 4
The contemporary approach to market concentration is
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"), which is the sum
of the squares of the market shares of all firms within a
market. This measure accounts for "both the distribution of
the market shares of the top four firms and the composition
of the market outside the top four firms."2 35 For the relevant
dealer markets, the approximate HHIs are as follows: 1785
for IRS, 2049 for CDS, and 1803 for all OTC derivatives.2 36
These numbers fall into the "moderately concentrated" range

232 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 12.4al, at 697-98.

233 See supraTable 3.
234 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 698 (noting that a vague

consensus emerged that a CR4 exceeding 75% was conducive to coercion).
On the other side, ISDA has measured the CR4 at 40.0% for interest rate

derivatives, 40.8% for credit derivatives, and 39.5% for all derivatives. See
Mengle, supra note 35, at 3. This is because ISDA insists that derivatives
activity is global in nature and, thus, the market should be defined
globally. See id. at 1-2. In doing so, global notionals are divided among
roughly 14 dealers rather than five. Id. at n.2.
235 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 1.5 (1992, rev 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/at

tachments/merger-review/hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FRH-2MAM]
[hereinafter DOJ, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].
236 See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note 76, at tbl.2. Note again that

BIS has calculated much smaller numbers, due to its definition of the
dealer market as global.
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under today's Department of Justice ("DOJ") Merger
Guidelines. 2 3 7
It is difficult to determine whether the HHI or the CR4 is
the better benchmark in this industry. The CR4 is a better
predictor of collusion where the major players are similar in
size, while the HHI better depicts a non-cooperative oligopoly
where the major players differ in size.23 8 The derivatives
dealer market is somewhere in between: the largest five
dealers are similar, but not identical in size, and each of the
five is several times larger than all dealers outside the
oligopoly. The slight differences within the group of five are
likely not significant enough that any single dealer is the
price leader; in fact, the order of the top four dealers has
shifted from quarter to quarter.23 9 Neither the HHI nor the
CR4 alone fully portrays the dynamics of the dealer market,
especially since each measure entails its own narrativecollusion for CR4 and non-cooperative oligopoly for HHI. On
balance, though, because this Article focuses on parallel
(that is, independent) exclusion, the HHI narrative is more
fitting. However, In re CDS Antitrust Litigation shows that
collusion is hardly beyond the pale for the large dealers.
An analysis of entry barriers also clarifies market share
calculations. Unlike the clearing markets, the downstream
dealer markets are not beset by large sunk costs and high
regulatory barriers. Indeed, the OCC's quarterly reports
show that a number of firms are active in the derivatives

237

In prior years, the threshold for high concentration was lower.

Compare U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, § 5.3 (2010), with DOJ, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 235, § 1.5.

238 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 698-704.
239 See, e.g., OCC, 2014 Q1 REPORT, supra note 35, at tbl.1; OCC, 2013
Q1 REPORT, supra note 173, at tbl.1; OCC, 2012 Q1 REPORT, supra note
173, at tbl.1; OCC, 2011 Q1 REPORT, supra note 173, at tbl.1; OCC 2010 Q1
REPORT, supra note 172, at tbl.1; OCC, 2009 QI REPORT, supra note 173, at
tbl.1.
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markets.24 0 Yet this does not mean that these "moderately
concentrated" markets, under the DOJ's HHI benchmark,2 4 1
are beyond reproach. Far from it. Where a small group of
firms enjoys "middling market power," exclusion is arguably
of greater concern, since entry barriers are surmountable
and anticompetitive conduct is required to keep rivals out.2 4 2
The persistence of concentration-at the hands of the same
dealers-therefore suggests that exclusion is at work.
Perennial dominance by the same firms therefore
constitutes a third feature that helps interpret concentration
in the dealer markets. An oligopoly's stability bespeaks
exclusion. 243 As discussed in greater detail in the next
Subsection, stability confirms that the dealer oligopoly's high
market shares translate into-or are evidence ofsubstantial market power in a manner that enables
exclusion.
The picture that emerges from the calculation of market
shares, then, is one where competition is suppressed at the
national level. The clearing markets for IRS and CDS might
be global, but the trading markets are broken up into
countries or regions, each dominated by a small circle of
financial institutions that have an uncanny ability to
maintain dominance regardless of market transformations.
C. Stability of the Dealer Oligopoly

"

Parallel exclusion requires a finding that there is
sufficient market power to produce anticompetitive effects. 2
Simply noting that two complementary markets are
240 See supra note 236. Even beyond regulated banks and BHCs, there
are hedge funds actively trading derivatives. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman

& Katy Burne, 'London Whale' Rattles Debt Market, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6,
2012 1:19 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303299604
577326031119412436 [https:Ilperma.ccIG74S-FK3F].
241 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
242 See Crane, supra note 37, at 34, 52-54.

243 Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1222-26.
244 Id. at 1237.
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concentrated is not enough to conclude that parallel
exclusion is at work, much less pernicious exclusion whose
procompetitive
its
outweigh
effects
anticompetitive
justifications. For this reason, Professors Hemphill and Wu
add another factor to the market power inquiry: the stability
of the excluders.24 5 Where the dominant players are few,
exclusionary schemes are more likely to succeed.24 6
This intuition bears out in the derivatives markets, whose
infrastructures are susceptible to capture by major dealers.
It turns out that the major dealers drive clearinghouse
membership and risk standards, and even when those
standards change, clearinghouse membership profiles
remain the same. 247 This stasis validates the intimations of
market power from market share analysis. It also fits within
a wider trend: the ingenuity of the dealer oligopoly at
preserving dominance.
For years, the five large dealers have controlled trading
in OTC derivatives. While their precise order within the
oligopoly might have shifted from quarter to quarter, as a
block they have pulled far ahead of all other dealers. 2 4 8 Thus,
other than reorientation inside the oligopoly, no other dealer
has managed to break into the oligopoly. In this respect, the
evolution of the CDS dealer market is especially poignant.
The top five dealers dominated this market before In re CDS
Antitrust Litigation and during its proceedings; in the first
two quarters following settlement, the results have not
changed.24 9 The membership rosters for ICE Clear Credit
245
246
247
248
249

Id. at 1237-38.
Id.
See infra notes 252-254 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 227, 239.
Compare OCC, 2012 Q1 REPORT, supra note 173, at tbl.2, with

OCC, 2014 Q1 REPORT, supra note 35, at tbl.2. See also OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, SECOND QUARTER 2016 tbl.2 (2016),

https://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financialmarkets/derivatives/dq216.pdf [https://perma.cclSZ4S-K6WV]; OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
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and ICE Clear Europe, which are updated more frequently
and which can serve as loose proxies for the headway of
smaller dealers, barely changed before, during, and after the
case. 2 5 0
This pattern of stagnancy is replicated across the IRS and
CDS clearinghouses. As Table 4 shows, there is a remarkable
degree of correlation among the members of SwapClear, ICE
Clear Credit, and ICE Clear Europe. 2 5 1 Affiliates of the major
players in the U.S. dealer markets are all represented, along
with Wells Fargo in some instances. The other members are
drawn from large Canadian, European, and Japanese
financial institutions.

TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, THIRD QUARTER 2016 tbl.2 (2016),

https://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/
dq316.pdf [https://perma.ccN68X-RT3H].
250 See infra notes 257-259 and accompanying text.
251 On dangers of correlation, see infra Section IV.C and Roe, supra
note 27, at 1677-78.
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TABLE 4: CORRELATION AMONG LARGE MEMBERS OF THE
252
MAJOR IRS AND CDS CLEARINGHOUSES
Clear
Credit

MeberICE
MebrSwapClear^
Bank of America 255
Barclays
BNP Paribas
Citigroup
Credit Suisse
Deutsche Bank
Goldman Sachs
HSBC
JPMorgan
Morgan Stanley
Nomura
Soci6t6 G6ndrale
The Bank of Nova Scotia
UBS
Wells Fargo

E Clear
Europe 25

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Our Clearing Members, supra note 178;
252 See SWAPCLEAR,
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, Participants, supra note 178; ICE Clear
Europe Membership, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, https://www.theice.co

m/clear-europe/membership#iceu-J [https://perma.cc/434K-J5B7](last
visited Dec. 31, 2016). This table consolidates affiliates of the members
into one entry.
253 SwapClear has two lists: U.S.-Domiciled Service Members and a
much larger group of Global Service Members. All the entries here are
taken from the U.S.-domiciled member list, except Bank of America,
HSBC, and The Bank of Nova Scotia, which appear under the global
members list. See SWAPCLEAR, Our ClearingMembers, supra note 178.
254 ICE Clear Europe's members trade in CDS and futures. This table
includes only CDS traders. Among these entities, only Bank of America,
Citi, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley are domiciled in the United States.
The other members (e.g., Goldman Sachs) hold membership in the name of
European affiliates. See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, ICE Clear Europe
Membership, supra note 252.
255 Merrill Lynch is counted as an affiliate of Bank of America.
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The exclusive nature of clearinghouses was at issue in In
re CDS Antitrust Litigation, where the plaintiffs alleged that
even well-capitalized applicants could not break in as
members. 2 56 Despite the settlement, the membership profiles
today are virtually identical to the membership profiles
when the case was pending. From June 2015 to February
2016, for instance, the only change to ICE Clear Credit was
that The Royal Bank of Scotland pulled out. 2 5 7 During this
time, ICE Clear Europe saw no change in its members who
trade in CDS. 258 Among its U.S.-domiciled members,
SwapClear saw no change either.2 59
This inertia is all the more astonishing given the strong
regulatory pressure to loosen membership criteria. Since
Dodd-Frank mandated central clearing for OTC derivatives,
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") and
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") have
implemented rules aimed at tempering the likelihood that
incumbent dealers would use clearinghouses to shut out
insurgent dealers. 2 60 As a consequence, clearinghouse
256 See In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476,
2014 WL 4379112, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014). See also Story, supra
note 88 (reporting that Bank of New York Mellon, MF Global, and State
Street had been unable to gain admission to the CDS clearinghouses).
257 See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, Participants, supra note 178
(archived pages from June, Aug., Oct., and Dec. 2015 and Feb. 2016) (on
file with author). On a bi-monthly basis starting from June 2015, the
author compiled and compared the membership rosters for the major IRS
and CDS clearinghouses to memorialize the changes.
258 See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, ICE Clear Europe Membership,
supra note 252 (archived pages from June, Aug., Oct., and Dec. 2015 and
Feb. 2016) (on file with author). ICE Clear Europe members who trade
only in futures were excluded from this tally.
259 See SWAPCLEAR, Our Clearing Members, supra note 178 (archived
pages from June, Aug., Oct., and Dec. 2015 and Feb. 2016) (on file with
author). On the differences between SwapClear's U.S.-domiciled and
global members, see supra notes 252-253.
260 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 39.12(a)(1) (2016) (product and participant
eligibility); 17 C.F.R § 39.12(a)(2)(iii) (2016) (minimum capitalization
requirement capped at $50 million).
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membership requirements have changed dramatically;
minimum capitalization requirements, for example, have
gone from $1 trillion 2 6 1 to $100 million 26 2 to now $50
million.2 63 It is telling, though, that in all this time, the
membership profile of the major clearinghouses has hardly
changed. If the members of the major clearinghouses are the
then
trading,
dominate
that
institutions
same
clearinghouses are merely an artifice whose creation by
regulators might have been well intended but whose
operation has the unintended effect of cementing the
dominant dealers' positions in the downstream markets.
The mechanisms that dominant dealers have deployed to
protect their dominance are noteworthy. In re CDS Antitrust
Litigation teaches that dealers had resorted to naked
collusion to shut out their competitors. Dealer actions appear
less interdependent now. Collectively, however, the major
dealers continue to play an outsized role in setting
clearinghouse risk standards. The Risk Committee of ICE
Clear Credit, the clearinghouse at the center of the case, is
comprised of 12 members, three of whom are independent
members, and nine of whom are clearinghouse members.
Presently, the nine insider-members are Bank of America,
Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citi, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank,
264
Five of
Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley.

261 Previously imposed by LCH.Clearnet. See TURING, supra note 118,
at § 5.6(3); CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 25-26 (statement of Jason

Kastner, Vice Chairman, Swaps and Derivatives Markets Association).
262 See ICE CLEAR CREDIT, CLEARING RULES § 201(b)(ii) (2011) (on file

with author). Previously, ICE Clear Credit's requirement was $5 billion in
adjusted net capital. See MF Global Class Action Compl., supra note 99, at

para. 66, 71.
263 See, e.g., ICE CLEAR CREDIT, CLEARING RULES § 201(b)(ii) (Mar. 29,
https://www.theice.com/publiedocs/clear credit/ICEClearCredit

2016),

Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/UMW5-D4JH].
264 ICE CLEAR CREDIT, ICE CLEAR CREDIT REGULATION AND
GOVERNANCE, 3 (Aug. 2015), https://www.theice.com/publiedocs/clear-credi
t/ICEClearCredit Regulation andGovernance.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2

DW-GWPW].
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these are the major U.S. dealers; the other four are major
European dealers. ICE Clear Credit's Risk Committee is
reconstituted annually, but the primary criterion for
membership on the committee is high Participation
Activities, defined as aggregated volume of trades by
notional amount.2 65 Even though ICE Clear Credit has
promulgated checks on the committee's authority, 26 6 the
committee can shape margin requirements, member
contributions to the guaranty fund, and, even more broadly,
any "determination" that the clearinghouse makes pursuant
to its own rules.26 7
If the nine dealer-members of ICE Clear Credit's risk
management committee arrive independently at policies that
frustrate the admission of otherwise qualified applicants,
what then? For all the structural reforms imposed by
financial regulators and the settlement of In re CDS
Antitrust Litigation, such denials of access would delay the
loosening of clearinghouse membership, thereby retaining
the lock of large dealers on the downstream market as well
as their cut of lucrative trading revenues for as long as
possible. As the law stands on monopolization, no recourse is
available.
Understandably, the major dealers should play some role
in shaping clearinghouse policies since they bear the brunt of
risk from derivatives trading.26 8 After all, notionals are
concentrated in the top dealers, who likely post more
collateral and contribute more to the guaranty fund than
265 See ICE CLEAR CREDIT CLEARING RULE 503(a)(vi) ("Composition of
the Risk Committee") (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/
clearcredit/ICEClearCreditRules.pdf [https://perma.cclW9RX-29GM].
266 See, e.g., id. at Rule 501 (stating that the ICE Clear Credit Board
not obligated to abide by the Risk Committee's recommendations). ICE,
too, is at the mercy of the dealers. Because dealers have cornered the lion's
share of CDS notionals, ICE ensures long-term survival by aligning with
the dealers more than it would by admitting more members.
267 See id. at Rules 502, 615.
268 See ICE CLEAR CREDIT REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE, supra note

264, at 2.
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smaller dealers. Because clearinghouses work to mutualize
risk, they must ensure that membership is restricted to wellcapitalized and well-run institutions that can weather the
shock of another member's default. It must also be conceded
that the outsized role of large dealers in the downstream
market is to be expected, given the risks associated with
market-making for derivatives.2 69 Yet those risks may have
been attendant in the markets' early years; today,
transparency from the indexing of IRS and CDS and the
injection of liquidity from higher trading volumes have
greatly mitigated those concerns.2 70 As to the control over
clearinghouses wielded by large dealers, it is altogether too
easy for incumbent members to hide behind risk mitigation
justifications for exclusionary practices.27 1 More importantly,
risk mutualization works best among diverse parties, so a
one-dimensional clearinghouse membership profile can end
up transmitting, rather than dissipating, systemic risk.27 2
Finally, the trends in the OTC derivatives markets at
inception are less relevant today. How the large dealers
behave now, in the face of market and regulatory
transformations, can subject them to renewed antitrust
scrutiny. The evidence above suggests that the dealers are
269 In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2476, 2014
WL 4379112, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014); CDS Antitrust Litig. Markit
Mem., supra note 95, at 5-6.
270 See In re Credit Default Swaps, 2014 WL 4379112, at *1-2. IRS
and CDS markets differ somewhat. IRS moved earlier toward index
trading and central clearing than CDS. See SwapClear History,
SWAPCLEAR, http://www.swapclear.com/why/swapclear-history.html
[https://perma.cc/ZUU3-PDHB] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016); Credit
Derivatives, supra note 153; MARKIT, MARKIT CREDIT INDICES: A PRIMER 7
(2008), https://www.markit.com/news/Credit%20Indices%20Primer.pdf
[https:/!perma.cc/82YB-N5GT]. Whether as a result of these trends or not,
SwapClear has more members than either of the ICE clearinghouses. See
supra note 178. Of course, the IRS trading market is far larger, covering
referent currencies around the world. See BIS, 2014 OTC DERIVATIVES
STATISTICS, supra note 148, at 2-6.
271 Chang, supra note 14, at 85-86.
272 See infra Section IV.C.
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acting to keep rivals out of the clearinghouses, albeit acting
independently without coordination. The dealers certainly
have the market power to do so, and the clearinghouses have
the market power to facilitate exclusion.
The attention lavished by this Section upon the market
definition/market share paradigm may seem unnecessary
and even old-fashioned by today's standards. Over the last
few decades, antitrust has become comfortable enough with
inferring market power from anticompetitive effects that
market definition/market share need not be the gauge of
market power. 273 Nevertheless, this Article opts for the
traditional approach (and, consequently, a long Section on
market power) because the ultimate goal is different than a
re-examination of market definition-it is to push Section 2
jurisprudence toward recognizing shared monopoly, so as to
redress parallel exclusion. In the service of that goal, this
Article aims to head off any criticism over the rigor of its
analysis of market power. While market definition provides
the ancillary benefit of highlighting blind spots in financial
regulation, 274 its major benefit is to preempt the distracting
arguments that would have flowed from going straight to
anticompetitive effects.
IV. HARMS OF PARALLEL EXCLUSION
Plaintiffs cannot prevail against an exclusionary scheme
unless the scheme's anticompetitive effects outweigh its
enhanced efficiencies. 27 5 This Section evaluates the harms of
parallel exclusion from three perspectives: competition
(Section IV.A), consumers (Section IV.B), and systemic risk

273 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C.
Cir. 2001). See also Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1237 ("The status of
monopoly power could be inferred from the effects of the conduct.").
274 For a summary, see supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
275 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 5.4b2, at 298; Hemphill & Wu, supra
note 6, at 1237-38.
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(Section IV.C), and leaves the benefits and balancing to
Section V.
Others have explored the effects of concentration in the
derivatives markets.2 7 6 Thus, this Section connects this
Article to other scholarly trends. One trend is the burgeoning
idea that competition and systemic risk are dueling
interests, which is a variation of the old banking debate over
whether competition enhances stability.2 77 Another trend is a
recent pivot to antitrust for solutions to problems in
finance-for example, how financial intermediaries impede
transparency and efficiency.2 78 Channeling the malleability
that scholars see in antitrust, this Section frames "harms"
broadly so as to encompass not only anticompetitive effects
but also negative effects on the health of the financial
system.27 9
A. Harm to Competition
Exclusionary schemes harm competition. Under the
theories of leveraging and foreclosure, the dominance of a
firm in one market (e.g., an airport or a clearinghouse) can
be parlayed into dominance in another market (commercial
air traffic or derivatives trading) if there is sufficient nexus

&

276 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 14, at 73; Greenberger, supra note 21,
at 252; Litan, supra note 189, at 22; Turbeville, supra note 21, at 6.
277 See Thorsten Beck, Olivier De Jonghe & Glenn Schepens, Bank
Competition and Stability: Cross-Country Heterogeneity, 22 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 218, 218-219 (2013); Iftekhar Hasan & Matej Marinc,
Should Competition Policy in Banking Be Amended During Crises?
Lessons from the EU, EUR. J.L. EcoN. 295, 296, 308-17 (2013).
278 See Judge, supra note 77, at 626; see also Jonathan R. Macey
James P. Holderoft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust
Approach to FinancialRegulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1403-08, 1417-18
(2011); Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a
Model for Breaking up the Banks that Are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 821, 827 (2011).
279 Of course, this proposition must contend with the antitrust injury
standing requirement. See infra notes 324-327 and accompanying text.
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between the two markets. 28 0 Leveraging and foreclosure
work all the better if one market is controlled by a natural
monopoly that is indispensable to an adjacent market, and
the dominant firms in the adjacent market direct the natural
monopoly. 2 8 1
In derivatives markets, the anticompetitive effects of
convergence in clearing and trading are not theoretical, but
real. Contemporaneous with In re CDS Antitrust Litigation,
the brokerage firm MF Global commenced an action against
virtually the same set of defendants for cornering the CDS
trading market by restricting access to ICE Clear Credit.28 2
In re CDS Antitrust Litigation itself shows how large dealers
allegedly forestalled the development of exchanges and
alternative clearinghouses, innovations that would have
moved the CDS market more quickly along its trajectory
toward transparency and efficiency.28 3
Consolidation and settlement of the cases brought about
certain reforms-for example, commitment by ICE to build
an open-access, anonymous CDS trading platform similar to

280 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 348-49; Rey & Tirole, supra
note 3, at 2153-58, 2194. For criticisms, see Richard S. Markovits, Tie-ins,
Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory Part II: Tie-ins, Leverage, and the
American Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195 (1970); Richard A. Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 929 (1979).
281 With a natural monopoly, market power in at least one market is
assured. From this was borne the essential facilities doctrine. See Stephen
M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Essential Facilities Doctrine: The
Lost Message of Terminal Railroad 2-4 (UC Berkeley Pub. L Research
Paper No. 2407071, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2407071 [https://perma.cc/4WNW-J5ZY]. Detractors of this doctrine
are numerous and eminent. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities:
An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841
(1990); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 237 (2005); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, L.L.P. 540 U.S. 398, 399 (2004).
282 See MF Global Complaint, supra note 99, at 1-3.
283 See supra text accompanying notes 83-88.
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an exchange. 2 8 4 Fortuitously, the platform appears to
replicate the exchange that the large dealers had driven to
the ground, in a move that became the basis for suit."' On
the surface, the new platform almost certainly spells the
demise of dealer dominance-once the venture gets off the
ground.28 6 In a strange twist, however, the platform's success
depends on widespread adoption of central clearing. 28 7 This
is because central clearing provides independent assurance
of creditworthiness, without which no trader would agree to
transact with an anonymous counterparty. 28 8 Yet dominant
dealers control ICE Clear Credit's risk committee, who are
loath to see the platform take off. Even if it does succeed, the
platform would only operate for one type of CDS, leaving
more complex types of CDS still within the province of large
dealers. 289

It remains to be seen whether ICE Clear Credit's dealerdominated risk committee will embrace the trading platform
or instead find ways of obstructing and delaying the
platform's implementation. If the latter transpires, then one
casualty will be innovation. While denying rival dealers
access to ICE Clear Credit inhibits competition in the dealer
markets, blocking an alternate trading platform prevents a

284 As a result of settlement, ISDA also announced its intention to
make its decision-making processes more inclusive. See Decl. of Darrell
Duffie in Support of Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Approval of Settlement at para.
9, 13-14, In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-02476,
2016 WL 2731524 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2016), 2015 WL 6869070; Mike
Kentz, ICE Plans Single-name CDS Platform, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2015
1:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/3 1/markets-derivativescds-idUKL1N1161A520150831 [https://perma.cc/Z2PM-7G731.
285 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
286 The platform is all-to-all and anonymous, which means that
buyers and sellers transact with one another much like on an exchange,
without having to go through the closed and opaque intermediary of
dealers. See Kentz, supra note 284.
287 See Kentz, supra note 284.
288 Id.
289 That is, single-name CDS. See id.; see also supra note 143.
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seismic transformation that could upend the dealer model
altogether. Of course, innovation-in particular, disruptive
innovation-is often a tradeoff for the stability of natural
monopolies; where a natural monopoly facilitates parallel
exclusion, innovation is sure to suffer alongside price.29 0
Competition and innovation can be ethereal concepts. To
crystallize the harms of parallel exclusion, we must also
identify who is harmed. The vast majority of derivatives
dealers are not members of SwapClear, ICE Clear Credit, or
ICE Clear Europe.2 91 This includes State Street and Bank of
New York ("BNY") Mellon, the eighth and ninth largest
BHCs, respectively, as well as predecessors of the sizeable
brokerage firms MF Global and Newedge, all of whom
previously failed to join ICE Clear Credit. 29 2 Exclusion from
the clearinghouses primarily harms this set of dealers by
suppressing their trade revenues; they can satisfy the

290 On parallel exclusion's capacity to harm price and innovation, see
Hemphill & Wu, supra note 6, at 1185, 1210-12.
291 See SWAPCLEAR,
Our Clearing Members, supra note 178;
INTERCONTINENTAL
EXCHANGE,
Participants, supra
note
178;
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, ICE Clear Europe Membership, supra note
252. Citi, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Bank of America, and Morgan
Stanley are members of all three clearinghouses. Affiliates of HSBC are as
well, but HSBC is a financial conglomerate headquartered outside the
United States. Wells Fargo, however, is a U.S.-based entity that,
anomalously, belongs to SwapClear and ICE Clear Credit. But Wells
Fargo is also a traditional commercial bank-and a goliath at that. Its
commercial bank subsidiary is the fourth largest in the United States,
with assets of well over $1 trillion. See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note
76, at tbl.1. Perhaps its forays into the IRS and CDS markets are the
result of leveraging (by way of tying) that dominance as a purveyor of
credit.
292 See Story, supra note 88. MF Global would eventually sue the
large dealers before going defunct. See MF Global Complaint, supra note
99, at 1. Newedge, having merged into Soci6t6 Gdn6rale, is on SwapClear.
See Daniel P. Collins, New Day for Newedge, Or Should We Say SocGen?,
Futures Mag. (July 11, 2014) http://www.futuresmag.com/2014/07/11/newday-newedge-or-should-we-say-socgen [https://perma.cc/R3R5-5UJC];
SWAPCLEAR, Our Clearing Members, supranote 178.
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central clearing mandate only by paying to access
clearinghouses through the current members.2 93
Focusing on competitors skews our impression of the
stakes, though, as a fight between trillionaires and
billionaires. Each of the five dominant dealers holds just
under or well over $1 trillion in assets, while State Street

and BNY Mellon wield hundreds of billions.29 4 This is, in
reductionist terms, a conflict between big banks and colossal
banks, or hedge funds and colossal banks, in which neither
side tends to arouse sympathies. For this reason, the
remainder of the Section examines the effects of parallel
exclusion on consumers and systemic risk, so as to paint a
more holistic picture. It is also helpful to bear in mind the
ultimate detriments of distorted competition: higher prices
and less innovation.2 95

B. Harm to Consumers
Parallel exclusion in derivatives markets both inflates
296
prices for financial products and reduces their availability.
Consequently, end-users of derivatives must pay more or

293 In the first quarter of 2016 alone, the top four commercial banks

generated a combined $2.815 billion in trading revenue from interest rate
positions (over 91.7% of revenues for the entire market) and $305 million
from credit positions (over 91.3%). See OCC, 2016 Q1 REPORT, supra note

76, at tbl.7.
294 Id. Again, Wells Fargo is an outlier: as the lone trillionaire which
holds membership to some clearinghouses but is not active in derivatives
trading, its bread and butter is lending.
295 On this point, the maxim that "antitrust protects competition, not
competitors" is helpful. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
320 (1962). This has been taken to mean, among other things, that injury
single competitor, standing alone, does not prove [the]
'a
to
anticompetitive effect' necessary to establish antitrust injury." HCI

Technologies, Inc. v. Avaya, Inc., 241 F. App'x 115, 123 (4th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Military Servs. Realty, Inc. v. Realty Consultants of Va., 823 F.2d

829, 832 (4th Cir. 1987)).
296 See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 353-55 (2011).
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forego hedging options altogether.2 9 7 Thus, customers bear a
higher cost.
Because existing literature has already examined these
possibilities for the derivatives markets,2 9 8 this Section
canvasses them below. In short, this line of analysis unfolds
according to traditional antitrust principles, which hold that
exclusion constricts consumption by raising prices.2 9 9
By countering exclusion and price inflation, the law spurs
increased consumption of financial instruments whose
valuations can fluctuate wildly."oo Such a prospect might be
unsettling given the history of scandals and crises associated
with derivatives trading.3 0 1 But then, antitrust is indifferent
about the fallout of increased consumption.3 0 2 Its balancing
of harms and benefits tends to revolve around an economic
vision of consumer welfare-specifically, whether consumers
are paying supracompetitive prices. 3 0 3 In fact, where natural
297 See Story, supra note 88 ("Pension funds today use derivatives to
hedge investments. States and cities use them to try to hold down
borrowing costs. Airlines use them to secure steady fuel prices. Food
companies use them to lock in prices of commodities like wheat or beef.").
298 See Chang, supra note 14, at 84-85.

299 In the context of parallel exclusion, see Hemphill & Wu, supra
note 6, at 1210.

300 See Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 337-73.
301 Notable examples are Orange County, Jefferson County, the City
of Detroit, Procter & Gamble, AIG, Lehman Brothers, and of course the
financial crisis. See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND
RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 53-57,
115-22, (2003);
Congressman Spencer T. Bachus, Federal Policy Responses to the

Predicament of Municipal Finance, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 759 (2009); Henny
Sender & Stephen Foley, Details of Detroit's Troubles Come to Light, FIN.
TIMES (Jul. 25, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/50a4250e-f53f-11e2-b4f800144feabdcO
[https://perma.cc/MVK3-F6SX];
FDIC,
The
Orderly
Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. under the Dodd-FrankAct,
5 FDIC

Q.

no. 2, 2011, https://www.fdic.gov/banklanalytical/quarterly/2011

vol5_2/lehman.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YH8-NSK7].
302 See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

509 U.S. 209 (1993).
303 See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal
of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE
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monopolies serve as gatekeepers to public goods, antitrust
does not even care whether public goods are actually good for
the public. Thus, curtailing parallel exclusion means that
financial regulators must step up their game in protecting
consumers.3 04

Concrete examples help to explicate this point. Today,
Southwest Airlines is one of the four largest commercial air
carriers in the country. However, Southwest began as a
small carrier in Texas, operating purely intra-state to avoid
federal regulation. 3 05 Two larger, federally regulated carriers
30 6
For
sued to enjoin Southwest's operations but lost.
passengers, Southwest has revolutionized air travel, in
particular by eschewing the hub-and-spoke method of
operation and introducing consumers to discount, no-frills
airfare. 3 0 7 By comparison, the major IRS and CDS
clearinghouses have yet to accommodate the entry of
smaller, more nimble dealers who do not fit the profile of
dominant dealers in the U.S. markets. 3 08 If more diverse

DAME L. REV. 191, 196 (2008) ("The primary goal of antitrust is to protect

consumers from paying higher prices to firms that have unfairly gained or
maintained market power.").
304 For one example of such protections, see 17 C.F.R. § 23.440(c)
(2015); Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9783 (Feb. 17, 2012).
Of course, clearing and standardization of derivatives help as well, by
ensuring that trades are adequately collateralized and products are not
too illiquid or strange.
305 See Tex. Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 473 F.2d 1150,
1151 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
306 Id.
307 Other innovations include frequent flyer programs for customers
and profit-sharing programs for employees. See History of Southwest
Airlines, AVIATION ONLINE MAG., http://avstop.com/history/historyfairlines/
southwest.html [https://perma.cc/4ETA-GR5Q].
308 That is, having approximately $1 trillion in assets, dominating
across multiple types of derivatives, and having been a derivatives
market-maker from the very beginning. See Katy Burne, Citadel Makes
Inroads into Swaps Arena, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2015 8:07 PM),
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members are permitted to join, then price reductions and
innovations for consumers will follow.
Of course, if that happens, then the current dealers are
likely to pull back from the market. There are indications
that this is beginning to happen. Deutsche Bank has
apparently decided to forego trading in certain types of
CDS.30 9 Since 2008, CDS trading volumes have steadily
declined.3 10 As derivatives become less bespoke, they
command a less supracompetitive premium.
C. Harm to Systemic Risk
Opening up the pool of clearinghouse members diversifies
the dealer markets, which has the added benefit of
dissipating risk. The risks associated with OTC derivatives
are multifaceted and played a major role in the financial
crisis. 3 1 1 Regulators proposed clearinghouses as one pathway

to dissipate risk by having a pool of members mutualize, or
share, the risk; 3 12 however, this process works best when
clearinghouse membership is reasonably diverse.31 3 In the
dominant IRS and CDS clearinghouses, diversification has
not happened yet because dealers have managed to exclude
http://www.wsj.com/articles/citadel-makes-inroads-into-swaps-arena1434997210 [https://perma.cc/DJ4M-B95L].
309 See Stephanie Ruhle & Sridhar Natarajan, Deutsche Bank Exits
Credit Swaps Trades on Most Companies, BLOOMBERG Bus. (Nov. 17, 2014
4:11 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-17/deutschebank-exits-most-single-name-credit-default-swap-trading
[https://perma.cc/4WEJ-VVHZ].
310 See
Credit Default Swaps Statistics Explorer, BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/tseries/OTCDE
RIV/H.N.A.Y.A.A.A.5A.5J?t=d5.2&c=&p=20152&i=23.4 [https://perma.cc/2
9FJ-KQ32].
311 See, e.g., FDIC, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers,
supranote 301.
312 CFTC, DCO General Provisions, supra note 28, at 69,415.
313 "Reasonably" because open access must still be balanced against a
clearinghouse's prerogative to screen members for risk. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 39.12(a)(1)(i), (iii) (2016).
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rivals, thereby perpetuating the concentration of both
notionals and risk within a small circle. 314 Recognizing this
propensity to exclusion, financial regulators have crafted
rules governing clearinghouses that include mandating open
access for dealers and restricting high capitalization
requirements for members.1 15 Tellingly, in announcing the
promulgation of one set of rules, the CFTC suggested that
concentration and systemic risk are intertwined and that if
more firms join clearinghouses, both sets of concerns will
diminish."'6
Conflating concentration and systemic risk-and thereby
intertwining antitrust and financial regulation-is not
without precedent. Recently, corporate and finance legal
scholars have proposed using antitrust to counter the selfentrenching impulse of financial intermediaries;3 1 7 to set a

threshold for liabilities that financial institutions can amass
(so as to pre-empt public bailout and the too-big-to-fail
phenomenon, or "TBTF"); 3 1 8 to more precisely define TBTF
by correlating it with monopoly power; 3 1 9 and to curtail
systemic risk by preventing the tying of swaps to loans.32 0
Nevertheless, these are odd ways of conceptualizing
antitrust. Just as antitrust does not care whether "public
goods" are actually "good for the public," antitrust doctrine
likely does not change to accommodate ancillary benefits
that are far outside its traditional focus. In other words,
before we can turn to antitrust for guidance, we must define
314 See supra note 277-278 and accompanying text.
315 See 17 C.F.R. § 39.12(a)(1), (a)(2)(iii) (2016).
316 See CFTC, DCO General Provisions, supra note 28, at 69,355
(stating that a $50 million capitalization requirement for members will
increase the number of firms clearing swaps, which will make markets
more competitive, increase liquidity, reduce concentration, and reduce
systemic risk).
317 Judge, supra note 77, at 639.
318 Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 278, at 1374.
319 Sharon E. Foster, Systemic Financial-Service Institutions and
Monopoly Power, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 357, 359 (2011).
320 Chang, supra note 194.
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the goals of antitrust, which is an endeavor rife with pitfalls
and disagreement.
There is some consensus that consumer welfare is
important.3 2 1 Beyond economic goals, academics disagree
intensely over whether antitrust accommodates social and
political goals, such as dissipating the political power that
concentrated industries wield.32 2 All in all, financial stability
and systemic risk seem to be too far beyond the scope of even
liberal constructions of antitrust goals.3 23
Further complicating any attempt to synchronize
competition and finance goals is the antitrust injury rule,3 24
a requirement imposed upon private litigants to prove

321 Though, of course, the definition of consumer welfare varies wildly.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 107-15 (1978); Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 303, at 196; Alan J.

Cf.

Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and
Why We Shoild Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 660-61, 670-71 (2010).
322 Cf. David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1219-24 (1988); David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency
Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 806,
809-28 (1989); Meese, supra note 321, at 664; ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING
CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW 29-48 (2015).
323 On the imprecise correlation between antitrust and TBTF, see
Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 465 (2011)
("Restricting bigness may mitigate systemic risk, but doing so by no means
eliminates it because systemic risk is not solely a function of size."); Barak
Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 605, 651 (2012) ("[T~he antitrust methodology examines
whether markets are functioning competitively, but it has no tools to
explore whether a financial institution is too big or too systematically
significant to fail.").
324 The rule is the last of a three-part inquiry, whereby plaintiffs must
show (i) an injury, (ii) caused by the violation of antitrust laws, (iii) that
qualifies as an antitrust injury. HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 16.3al, at
808. See also Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983) ("[Clongress did not intend the
antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might
conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.") (quoting Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972)).
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"injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
The antitrust injury rule has operated as a
prevent ....
check on private antitrust actions for decades. 3 26 It was
invoked in In re CDS Antitrust Litigation as well, though
without success. 27
The above realities mean that a dealer that is excluded
from the IRS or CDS clearinghouses cannot invoke the
concentration of systemic risk as an injury in itself. When it
comes to the weighing of anticompetitive effects and
enhanced efficiencies, systemic risk almost certainly plays no
role. At most, plaintiffs can hope for a nod to systemic risk as
one of a broad class of harms implicated by concentration in
the dealer markets, which can-but need not necessarily-be
considered by the court or regulator.
Current scholarly trends do give some hope to the
possibility of accounting for systemic risk. While corporate
and finance law scholars challenge their traditional
undergoing
also
are
scholars
antitrust
paradigms,
introspection. Some question how competition policy could
have permitted financial institutions to amass so much
power. 32 8 Others question the relevance of antitrust if it
cannot deal with the political and social fallout of
concentration in the financial markets.3 29 While curtailing
systemic risk has no formal place in the current rubric of

325 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) ("The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the

violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.").
326 See, e.g., Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 519; Cargill, Inc. v.

Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986).
327 No. 13-MD-2476, 2014 WL 4379112, at *7 (Sept. 4, 2014).
328 See Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV.

J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 557, 558-60 (2010).
329 Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 551, 624 (2012) ("Antitrust's current objectives of promoting
consumer welfare and efficiency are poorly defined. . . . The quest
distanced antitrust from important policy issues (such as systemic risk)
and rendered antitrust less relevant. Consequently, now is the time to
reconsider antitrust's political, social, and moral concerns.").
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exclusion, it is drawing attention as a noteworthy
consequence of more rigorous application of antitrust law.
V.

OFFSETTING BENEFITS

This Section examines how the benefits of parallel
exclusion offset, in whole or in part, any resulting harms to
the derivatives markets. The Section begins conventionally,
with enhanced efficiencies. For parity with this Article's
comprehensive approach to harms, this Section also
evaluates the argument that narrowing the pool of dealers
and clearinghouse members mitigates risk. Finally, this
Section provides a framework for balancing.
A. Enhanced Efficiencies

'

Dealer control over clearinghouses can minimize
transaction costs and eliminate double markups-i.e., one
set of fees being charged for clearing and another set for
execution (trading).3 30 This argument is most pertinent to
vertically integrated clearinghouses, where the provider of
execution services actually owns the clearinghouse. In such
instances, the derivatives consumer need only transact
once-with the market-maker, who can then procure
clearing without having to undergo another round of
bargaining. This saves the consumer the trouble of
independently searching out a clearinghouse, as well as
incurring separate fees for clearing.3 3
Clearing and execution are apt for integration because
the services complement each other so well: unless an
exception applies, a trade cannot be fully executed without
being cleared. Bringing both spheres under common
ownership minimizes the impulse of each constituent

330 Craig Pirrong, Clearing Up Misconceptions on Clearing, 31 REG.
22, 25 (2008).
331 See id. at 24-25.
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provider to inflate its prices and externalize the impact of
markups to the complementary provider. 33 2
Technically, however, IRS and CDS clearinghouses are
not vertically integrated. SwapClear is owned and operated
by a subsidiary of LCH.Clearnet Group Ltd., a U.K.
company.33 3 LCH.Clearnet Group is majority owned (57%) by
the London Stock Exchange Group, with the remainder
owned by its members and other exchanges.33 4 ICE Clear
Credit and ICE Clear Europe are owned and operated by
ICE; these entities, too, are not majority-owned by the
downstream dealers.3 3 5 To be sure, vertical integration does
abound in the derivatives world, particularly for exchangetraded products.3 36 With OTC IRS and CDS, however, the

332

See id. at 25.

333 See SwapClear History, supra note 270; Company Structure,
LCH.CLEARNET, http://www.lchclearnet.com/en/about-us/company-

structure [https://perma.cc/Q6VV-JS9J] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
334 About Us, LCH.CLEARNET, http://www.1chclearnet.com/en/about-us
[https://perma.cc/9CKC-QDQ4] (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
335 See Intercontinental Exch., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 50

(Mar. 30, 2015). When ICE purchased The Clearing Corporation ("TCC")
to launch its first CDS clearinghouse, see supra note 95, the venture was
structured around a Cayman Islands exempted limited partnership with
two classes of limited partners: one class of interests was held by ICE and
its affiliates, and the other class of interests was held by shareholders of
TCC, with profits split evenly between the two classes. See ICE & TCC,
Request for Exemption from Certain Provisions of the U.S. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933 with Respect to
Cleared Credit Default Swaps 7 (Feb. 26, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/rules/
exorders/2009/ice-trust-exreq.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3FB-ZRDR]. The TCC
shareholders were affiliates of Bank of America, Barclays, Citi, Credit
Suisse, Creditext Group, Deutsche Bank, GFInet Inc., Goldman Sachs,
ICAP Securities, LabMorgan Corp., Markit, MF Global, Morgan Stanley,
UBS, and U.S. Exchange Holdings, Inc. Id. at 9 n.9.
336 CME Group, for instance, owns and operates proprietary
clearinghouses that only clear products sold on CME exchanges. For
criticisms, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTS BEFORE THE DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 28, at 10-11. In Europe, clearing and execution silos
dot the derivatives landscape. For criticisms, see Mike Reece, Competition
or Consolidation?: The Outlook for Interoperability Among European
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upstream and downstream markets coalesce not by common
ownership, but by the control that downstream players exert
as members of the upstream facility. Thus, the mechanisms
of exclusion proceed slightly differently.3 37
In theory, then, because clearinghouses are not majorityowned by dealers, customers cannot automatically avoid
extra transaction costs and double markups. The majority
owners of clearinghouses may well decide to pursue
supracompetitive pricing. Yet transactional and pricing
efficiencies still hold in practice because the major dealers,
as clearinghouse members, will have negotiated ex ante for
clearing services and factored clearing prices into the overall
cost of execution charged to end-users. Currently, the costs of
clearing are fairly low and continue to decline.3 38 This pricing

&

CCPs, THOUGHT (J.P. MORGAN) (May 1, 2012), https://www.jpmorgan.com/
cm/BlobServer/Competition orConsolidationTheOutlookfor Interoper
ability AmongEuropeanCCPspdf.pdfblobkey=id&blobwhere=13205497
06572&blobheader=application/pdf&blobheadername l=Cache-Control&
blobheadervaluel=private&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs
[https://perma.cc/NPK7-V9MX].
337 With parallel exclusion, a group of dealers are acting
independently, rather than one exchange refusing to allow its
clearinghouse to clear products on a rival exchange.
338 For the example of securities clearing by NSCC, see Crystal
Bueno, More Transparency on Clearing Costs, DTCC CORPORATE
NEWSLETTER (Aug. 2009), http://164.109.172.95/news/newsletters/dtc/2009
/aug/clearing-cost transparency.php [https:I/perma.cclXED2-JLZ9]. Similar pricing information is harder to obtain for the IRS and CDS
clearinghouses, which have a shorter history. However, on efforts to
increase transparency for the industry, see, for example, Stan Ivanov
Lee Underwood, CDS Clearing at ICE: A Unique Methodology, FUTURES
INDUS., Nov. 2011, at 31,
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear credit/
FIAmagazine CDS risk management article.pdf [https://perma.cc/T562KUQP]; Order Granting Temporary Exemptions under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 in Connection with Request on Behalf of ICE Clear
Europe Limited Related to Central Clearing of Credit Default Swaps, SEC
Interpretive Letter, 2009 WL 10477350 17 (July 23, 2009),
https://www.
sec.gov/rules/exorders/2009/34-60372.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U3FB-ZRDR]
(pricing transparency a condition for relief for ICE Clear Europe from
temporary registration).
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structure may be less a result of vertical integration or
dealer control than the clearing functionality itself. Clearing
is a regulated process in a highly regulated industry.3 3 9 If the
industry were to charge excessive prices, then the central
clearing mandate would be eviscerated, drawing even more
intense regulatory scrutiny. The closest analog to the
industry is, again, that of an infrastructure or public utility
operating at close to cost (e.g., an airport); the fear of
anticompetitive effects arises not so much from the utility
itself but from the self-serving impulses of those who direct
the utility, particularly if they also hold a dominant stake in
an adjacent market (e.g., airlines).

B. Credit Risk Mitigation
An additional justification of exclusion, one based not on
antitrust but on finance, is that restricting clearinghouse
membership to large, well-capitalized institutions reduces
counterparty credit risk-that is, the risk that one party to a
34
After all, the charge of clearinghouses
trade might defaulta.
was to reduce systemic risk in the OTC derivatives markets,
and keeping out smaller and riskier traders can help achieve
the
possess
therefore
Clearinghouses
goal.34 1
that
prerogative to set risk standards. 34 2 Arguably, large dealers
should steer this standard-setting process, since they best
understand the risks not only of derivatives but also of
diversifying the trading markets. As the dominant sellers of
derivatives instruments and go-to institutions for offsetting
derivatives positions, large dealers hold most of a market's
derivatives notionals. In any given market, large dealers are
ubiquitous counterparties. By extension, they also shoulder
most of the market's credit risk. Rightfully, then, large

See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Title VIII, 12 U.S.C. § 5461 (2015) et seq.
See Feder, supra note 17, at 689, 722-27.
341 See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 22, at 66-67 (comments of
Roger Liddell, LCH ClearNet Group).
342 See id. at 15-16 (comments of Jonathan Short, ICE Trust U.S.).
339
340
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dealers
should
play a significant
role in
setting
34 3
clearinghouse standards.
Prior to the central clearing mandate, credit risk and
systemic risk were closely linked. Counterparties in an OTC
derivatives trade had to bilaterally clear the trade, which
meant that each side bore the risk that the other might not
honor contractual obligations. 3 4 4 Because large dealers were
directly connected to far more counterparties than smaller
dealers, large dealers also assumed more credit risk. This
degree of interconnectivity made large dealers systemically
risky. For example, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in
2008 jeopardized not only its multitude of trading
counterparties but also the entire financial system. 3 4 5
Lehman's default on derivatives trades could have triggered
those counterparties to default on other obligations. 34 6 Thus,
Dodd-Frank not only created a system for the orderly
liquidation
of
systemically
significant
financial
34 7
institutions,
it also required derivatives trades to be
centrally
overseen
and
effectively
guaranteed
by
clearinghouses. 34 8 With the central clearing mandate,
lawmakers and regulators ostensibly prioritized credit risk

343 See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
344 For a nuanced comparison of bilateral and central clearing, see

Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and
Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 91-93 (2011).
345 See FDIC, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers, supra
note 301, at 1.
346 See id. at 8 ("A complex, systemic financial company can hold very
large positions in qualified financial contracts, often involving numerous

counterparties and back-to-back trades, some of which may be opaque and
incompletely documented. A disorderly unwinding of such contracts . ..
can have severe negative consequences for the financial company, its

creditors, its counterparties, and the financial stability of the United
States.").
347 12 U.S.C. § 5383, 5386, 5390 (2012).
348 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C.
§ 8302(d)(1) (2012).
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and systemic risk mitigation above all other concerns,
including competition.
Caveats and counterarguments to the credit risk
of
embrace
markets'
The
abound.
justification
of
some
alleviated
have
standardization and transparency
349
The clearing functionality in
the credit risk concerns.
particular has greatly reduced the credit risks borne by large
dealers, who now novate their positions to clearinghouses.3 5 0
Risk is best mitigated when dispersed across a diverse pool
of members, but thus far, the IRS and CDS clearinghouses
have
not
significantly
opened
up.351
Ultimately,
clearinghouses cede too much of their risk management
discretion to entities clouded by strong incentives to keep
trading and execution closed off to competitors.3 52
C. Weighing the Harms Against the Benefits
Given the multitude of issues implicated by parallel
exclusion in derivatives markets, how should its harms be
compared against its benefits? To prevent the balancing
framework from becoming too unwieldy, the exclusion
analysis could be restricted to traditional antitrust concerns
such as anticompetitive effects, consumer welfare, and
enhanced efficiencies.3 5 3 Within this rubric, this Article
asserts that the anticompetitive effects of parallel exclusion
in derivatives markets, along with the harms to consumers,
outweigh the efficiencies. The propensity of large dealers to
sustain a wide bid/ask spread is too well-documented, 354 and
the setbacks to innovation too significant,3 55 to be offset by
349 See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
350 See Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and

Systemic Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to
Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 65-66 (2011).
351 See supra notes 251-254 and 257-259 and accompanying text.
352 See Chang, supra note 14, at 97.
353 See supra notes 35, 55.
354 See supra Section II.B.
355 See supra Section IV.B.
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efficiencies that rest upon dubious assumptions.3 5 6 In sum,
this scheme should not be permitted to continue.
What animates this Article, however, is the aim of
infusing the exclusion rubric with an awareness of financial
risk. To that end, this Section contemplated systemic risk
exacerbation as a harm of parallel exclusion and credit risk
mitigation as a benefit. Considered in tandem, systemic risk
is exacerbated-by keeping clearinghouse membership
closed and the dealer oligopoly impermeable-far more than
credit risk mitigated by virtue of the same behavior. This
tips the scales even more dramatically against parallel
exclusion.
However, accounting for extra-antitrust concerns such as
financial risk may further muddle an already confused
framework. The assessment of market power has been
fraught with controversy, and anticompetitive effects and
efficiencies have been subjected to similarly intense debate
over antitrust's objectives. Piling on financial risk will not
simplify the enforcer's task of weighing the harms and the
gains.3 57 If anything, it vitiates an institutional design that
has partitioned competition and financial stability as
competences for antitrust and financial regulators,
respectively.3 5 8

See supra notes 330-339 and accompanying text.
For an especially poignant description of the quandary, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 6 (2013) ("What is
reasonable or sensible will often depend on moral feelings, common sense,
sympathies, and other ingredients of thought and feeling that can't readily
be translated into a weighing of measurable consequences."). Due perhaps
to the complexity of its substance, antitrust has had a history of
obfuscating procedure. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
547-48 (2007) (pleadings); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576-77 (1986) (summary judgment).
358 The boundaries are somewhat fluid though. Financial regulators
are empowered to consider the effects upon competition in their
rulemaking. The literature on regulatory capture proffers antitrust as a
countermeasure to wrest control from interested regulators.
356

357

No. 3:657]

SECOND-GENERATION MONOPOLIZATION

737

The current institutional design need not be sacrosanct.
The failure of both sets of regulators to head off the financial
crisis suggests that the regulatory design is too rigid to
anticipate and correct for its own blind spots. 35 9 This track
record does not bode well for the OTC derivatives markets.
Even if monopolization jurisprudence develops to the point of
curtailing parallel exclusion, today's dominant dealers will
exit the markets, and new hedging strategies will arise in
the interstices between financial regulation and antitrust. 360
themselves were innovations
all, derivatives
After
responding to the desire of end-users to transfer or modulate
market risks in novel ways.36 1
Market definition, however, may offer a way of thwarting
the possibility that new alternatives to derivatives will
precipitate another crisis. Anticipating substitute products is
a key part of market definition; antitrust regularly contends
with competing narratives about substitutability and crosselasticities in drawing the relevant market.3 62 Financial
regulators, however, are often slow to predict the
unregulated spaces that regulated firms turn to. 3 6 3 By
359 For example, as traditional financial intermediaries faced
heightened regulation, risk functions were outsourced to less regulated
intermediaries in the capital markets. Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing
Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (2010); Kathryn Judge,
FragmentationNodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 665-67 (2012). Astonishingly, even
where change has been slow and incremental, regulators have failed to
exhibit the imagination necessary to rein in the unintended consequences.
See, e.g., Omarova, supra note 225, at 1041-42.
360 See supra note 309.
361 See Hu, supra note 17, at 1465-67.
362 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 110-18.
363 See Whitehead, supra note 359, at 5-7; Sung Eun (Summer) Kim,
Managing Regulatory Blindspots: A Case Study of Leveraged Loans, 32
YALE J. ON REG. 89, 92 (2015). This, after all, is the source of the term
"shadow banking." See Laura E. Kodres, What Is Shadow Banking?, FIN.
& DEV., June 2013, at 42, 42 (citing Paul McCulley, Remarks at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Economic Symposium (Sept. 5,
2007)).
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plodding through a rigorous market definition/market share
analysis for derivatives and their substitutes, regulators may
be able to chase down the market-makers for new products
and at least arrest the velocity with which unregulated
markets expand. 36 4 This more nimble, functional approach
can
help
regulators
overcome
their
institutional
predispositions to detect the trends linking . disparate
products and players. 36 5

VI. CONCLUSION
One glaring deficiency of the traditional, "firstgeneration" approach toward monopolization is its insistence
on anticompetitive conduct by a single firm. The inability of
antitrust
to
recognize
a
"second
generation"
of
monopolization harms from parallel exclusion consigns the
OTC derivatives markets to a degree of concentration that
imperils competition, consumers, and control over systemic
risk.
The dominant derivatives dealers wield the market power
to harm competition. Today, these dealers drive the
standard-setting processes of derivatives clearinghouses,
natural monopolies in the upstream market. Large dealers
can independently decide to adopt risk guidelines that
prevent their rivals from joining clearinghouses-which, due
to the indispensability of the clearing function to trading,
raises the rivals' costs. This is but the latest in a pattern of
recidivist exclusion characterizing the dealer oligopoly. In
the past, large dealers have resisted market and regulatory
transformations by colluding to stifle innovations in both
clearing and trading.
Market power in the clearing and trading markets is
made manifest by a rigorous application of the traditional
More research must be done to flesh out how this might unfold.
See Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, Design of Financial Systems:
Towards a Synthesis of Function and Structure, J. INV. MGMT. First
Quarter 2015, at 6, 20-21.
364
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market definition/market share paradigm. For all its
infirmities, this paradigm is useful as a way of illuminating
blind spots in financial regulation. Of course, this blending of
antitrust principles and financial regulation must contend
with larger questions on institutional design and the goals of
antitrust. This Article anticipates that addressing those
issues can help slow the speeds at which financial complexity
outpaces regulation.

